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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in a public
referendum to leave the European Union. The margin of victory for the
Leave Campaign was slight, 51.9% to 48.1%, and the fallout from the
contentious and polarizing campaign has created perhaps the greatest
rupture in British politics in over a century. 1 David Cameron, the
Conservative Prime Minister who initiated the referendum and led the
unsuccessful campaign to remain in the European Union, resigned,
stating that “fresh leadership was needed to enact Brexit.” 2 In March
2017 his successor, Theresa May, triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on
European Union (“TEU”), the process by which a member state may
leave the EU.3 The latter afforded the UK government two years to
negotiate an exit deal. 4 After failing to secure an overall majority in
2017, the May government was forced to rely (by virtue of a
“confidence and supply” arrangement) on support from the largest
unionist party in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party
(“DUP”). 5 After lengthy negotiations with the European Union, May
brought a Withdrawal Agreement before the British House of
Commons but on three successive occasions she failed to secure
parliamentary approval for the deal. She too resigned in June 2019.6
1. See GEOFFREY EVANS & ANAND MENON, BREXIT & BRITISH POLITICS ix (2017); THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF BREXIT 1, 15 (Nedergaard et al. eds., 2018); Will
Jennings & Martin Lodge, Brexit, the Tides and Canute: The Fracturing Politics of the British
State, 26 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 772 (2019); Nick Pearce & Gavin Kelly, Brexit and the Future
of the British Model of Democratic Capitalism, 90 THE POL. QU. 1 (2019).
2. DAVID CAMERON, FOR THE RECORD 680 (2019).
3. Article 50 provides that “[a]ny Member State may decide to withdraw from the
European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements,” and “In light of the
guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the
framework for its future relationship with the Union.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union art. 50, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 31 [hereinafter TEU].
4. A member state can withdraw even if no agreement is reach providing that two years
have elapsed from the time that the member state has notified the EU of its intention to withdraw.
See Jochen Herbst, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are
the “Masters of the Treaties?”, 6 GER. L.J., 1755 (2005); Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal
and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, LEGAL WORKING PAPERS SERIES, 24,
Dec. 2009.
5. The DUP secured ten seats in the 2017 Westminster general election. Sinn Féin, the
largest nationalist party in NI, has an abstentionist policy towards Westminster. See generally
Mary Murphy & Jonathan Evershed, Between the Devil and the DUP: The Democratic Unionist
Party and the Politics of Brexit, 1 BRITISH POLITICS (2019).
6. Oliver Wright & Francis Elliott, Theresa May in Tears as She Resigns, TIMES, May 24,
2019,
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/theresa-may-resigns-qnt625hgf
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May was replaced as Prime Minister by Boris Johnson, a former leader
of the Leave Campaign who pledged to “get Brexit done.” 7 At the time
of writing, having agreed to a new Withdrawal Agreement with the
European Union, Johnson has been forced to request a further extension
to the original two-year deadline for the departure of Britain from the
European Union. In October 2019, Johnson called a general election
with the express intention of securing a large enough majority to finally
secure passage of the Withdrawal Agreement. 8 He secured a large
majority in that election and the Withdrawal Agreement was passed in
January 2020.
Although the consequences of Brexit for the peace process in
Northern Ireland did not feature prominently in the referendum
campaign in Britain, the issue has since moved front and center in Irish,
British, and EU politics. 9 Recognizing the widespread consensus
amongst not just northern nationalists but also key figures in business
and agriculture, and indeed the security services, that a hard border in
Ireland should be avoided, the UK government agreed to a compromise
with the European Union in November 2017. The so-called “Irish
backstop” refers to a protocol appended to the 2017 draft Brexit
Withdrawal Agreement. It provided that, in the event of the United
Kingdom and European Union not agreeing to a future trade deal after
the transition period had ended, the whole of the United Kingdom
would enter a “single customs territory” with the European Union until
[http://perma.cc/F4SB-EAY7]; Heather Stewart, Theresa May Announces She Will Resign on 7
June, GUARDIAN, (May 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/24/theresamay-steps-down-resigns-tory-leader-conservative-brexit [https://perma.cc/W9HL-BT3H].
7. The Conservative Party slogan for the December 2019 General Election was “Get Brexit
Done.” Billy Perrigo, ‘Get Brexit Done.’ The 3 Words That Helped Boris Johnson Win Britain’s
2019 Election, TIME (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.time.com/5749478/get-brexit-done-sloganuk-election/ [https://perma.cc/3TYA-YRPT]. Heather Stewart, Boris Johnson Elected New Tory
Leader, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/23/borisjohnson-elected-new-tory-leader-prime-minister [https://perma.cc/PB6Q-Z62W].
8. To date three extensions of the original “two year” deadline have been requested by the
UK government and granted by the European Union – the most recent at the time of writing
extending to Jan. 31, 2020. Gordon Rayner, Boris Johnson to Use Huge Majority to Enshrine
Brexit Date in Law – With or Without a Trade Deal, TELEGRAPH (December 16, 2019),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/12/16/boris-johnson-use-huge-majority-enshrine2020-brexit-date-law/ [https://perma.cc/C4TL-8XLX].
9. See generally Cathy Gormley-Heenan & Arthur Aughey, Northern Ireland and Brexit:
Three Effects on the Border in the Mind, 19 BR. J. POL. INT. REL. 497 (2017); see TONY
CONNOLLY, BREXIT AND IRELAND 6-9 (2018); Paul Teague, Brexit, the Belfast Agreement and
Northern Ireland: Imperilling a Fragile Political Bargain, in press, POL. QU. (2019).
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such times as an alternative was agreed.10 This agreement was
effectively superseded and replaced by the revised Withdrawal
Agreement made between Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the
European Commission in October 2019 and, as noted above, was
finally passed into law in January 2020. A new protocol controversially
provides for checks on what is effectively a customs border between
Great Britain and the island of Ireland (a border down the Irish sea). As
discussed further below this amounts in the eyes of many unionists to
a “betrayal.” For his part, Johnson’s compromise is consistent with his
earlier stated belief that the Irish border issue has permitted, “the tail to
wag the dog” and that it is allowing the “whole of our agenda to be
dictated by this folly.” 11 This had never been the intention of those
advocating Brexit. As one senior advisor to the Leave Campaign
tweeted:
. . . [a]lmost everyone’s tried to avoid saying, up to now, the Irish
Border is not a top priority. No one wants to be responsible for any
future unrest or lawlessness. But it is the blunt truth. What happens
to the Irish border is far less important than that we truly leave the
EU. 12

As is discussed further below, the Irish government and the proremain majority of political parties in Northern Ireland have been
solidly supported by the European Union in their determination to
avoid a “hard border” in Northern Ireland lest it undermine the peace
process. 13 A key effect of the peace process was the removal of the
physical border in Ireland. This was enabled partly by an improved
security situation but also by virtue of the fact that both the United
10. See generally Eileen Connolly & John Doyle, Brexit and the Irish Border, Special
Issue, EUR. J. OF L. STUD. 153 (2019).
11. Unattributed, Boris Johnson: Irish Border “Tail Wagging the Dog” Over Brexit,
NEWS LETTER (June 8, 2018), https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/boris-johnson-irish-bordertail-wagging-the-dog-over-brexit-1-8526555 [https://perma.cc/UM84-MH4F]. Pat Leahy, ‘This
Folly’: Boris Johnson on the Border Issue, IRISH TIMES, (July 20, 2019),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/this-folly-boris-johnson-on-the-border-issue1.3961728 [https://perma.cc/DTN7-XUA7].
12. Andrew Lillco (@andrew_lilico), TWITTER (Nov. 13, 2018, 1:42 AM),
https://twitter.com/andrew_lilico/status/1062279529476038656
[https://perma.cc/9L3DCDAD].
13. Fifty-six percent of the electorate in Northern Ireland voted to remain in the 2016
referendum versus forty-four percent who voted to leave. Rory Carroll, Barnier Pledges EU
Support for Backstop in Event of No-Deal Brexit, GUARDIAN, (April 8, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/barnier-eu-support-backstop-ireland-no-dealbrexit [https://perma.cc/TMV3-RWH7].
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Kingdom and Ireland were members of the European Union. 14 With
security installations and customs posts removed, to all intents and
purposes, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic
became invisible. 15 Thirty thousand people cross this invisible border
each day to work or attend school and approximately 1.8 million cars
cross it each month. 16 Successive British governments have stressed
that they too are committed to avoiding a hard border in Ireland. They
have, however, failed to persuade the European Union, the Irish
government, or the pro-remain majority in Northern Ireland that such
an outcome is feasible (e.g., through the use of technology) in a context
whereby one part of the island of Ireland (the Republic) remains in the
EU Single Market and Customs Union and the other (Northern Ireland)
leaves. 17 The difficulties associated with resolving this conundrum
have been at the center of the British government’s negotiations and
discussions with Ireland and the other EU member states since the
Brexit referendum. Moreover, Brexit has thrown into sharp relief a
range of important human rights and legal considerations concerning
not just trade and commerce but also contested political and national
identity issues which lay at the heart of the conflict in the first place.
The research which underpins this article arises from two projects.
The primary source is a project funded by the Economic and Social
Research Council (“ESRC”) which focused on a range of Brexit related
themes in Northern Ireland including the impact on the peace process.18
Following an extensive interdisciplinary literature review, original data
was gathered using a range of methodologies between April 2017 and
14. See Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, supra note 9.
15. See Katy Hayward, The Pivotal Position of the Irish Border in the UK’s Withdrawal
from the European Union, 22 SPACE & POLITY 238 (2018).
16. Etain Tannam, Brexit and British Irish Relations, 163 RUSI J. 4, 4 (2018).
17. The European Single Market is the trading area described by the European
Commission as “one territory without any internal borders or any regulatory obstacles.” It is
built upon the “four freedoms” of the EU which permit the free movement of goods, capital,
services and labor. The EU Customs Union applies to countries within which customs (tariffs
and duties) have been removed from goods and ensures that countries charge the same import
duties to countries outside of the single market. For a detailed discussion, see generally
CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS (2016).
18. Brexit and Northern Ireland: The Constitutional, Conflict Transformation, Human
Rights and Equality Consequences (Grant Reference ES/R001499/1), UK RES. AND
INNOVATION,
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES/R001499/1
[https://perma.cc/WYW6NVLC] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). As well as the Authors, the project team included Professor
Colin Harvey (Queen’s University), Professor Rory O’Connell (Ulster University), and the staff
of the local human rights NGO, the Committee on the Administration of Justice.
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March 2019. Using a purposeful sampling methodology, twenty semistructured qualitative interviews were conducted with legal, political
and policy experts across the United Kingdom and Ireland. Forty-four
informal bilateral meetings were also carried out as well as six public
“townhall” meetings across Northern Ireland. All qualitative data were
coded using NVivo software. In addition, two of the authors conducted
specific peace process focused interviews with key interlocutors
(including mainstream and “dissident” republicans, loyalists, as well as
policing and security experts) as part of a project on the role of
apologies in dealing with the legacy of the past. 19
Our central thesis in this Article is that the Leave Campaign and
the determination to enact Brexit at all costs by sections of the British
Conservative party has re-energized a variant of English nationalism
and nostalgia for empire which has had a direct consequence on the
peace process in Northern Ireland and upon relations across the island.
In order to test the veracity of that proposition, we examine in detail a
number of key components of the relationship between the peace
process and the European Union.
First, drawing from the literature on imperialism and postcolonialism, we suggest how such a perspective helps us to make sense
of elements of Brexit. We then explore in more detail how Brexit has
impacted on aspects of the peace process in Ireland. Having reviewed
the ways in which EU membership helped improve Anglo-Irish
relations, we chart the deleterious consequences of Brexit. We then
examine the role of the European Union in the peace process, the Good
Friday Agreement and the transition from conflict since 1998. Next, we
explore the impact of Brexit on political relations within Northern
Ireland, including the mainstreaming of the debate on Irish
reunification. We then examine the relationship between Brexit and the
risk of future political violence and the challenges to the governance of
security. In the final section, we argue that law in general and human
rights guarantees, in particular, were central to the peace process. In
analyzing the major Brexit-related legal challenges, we examine some
notable government defeats concerning UK parliamentary sovereignty.
However, we argue that law has largely failed to protect the peace
19. Apologies, Abuses and Dealing with the Past: A Socio-Legal Analysis (Grant
Reference
ES/N010825/1),
UK
RES.
&
INNOVATION,
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FN010825%2F1 [https://perma.cc/2VBQ-TUSD] (last
visited Nov. 21, 2019). That project is ongoing but to date a total of thirty conflict related
interviews have been conducted.
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process from the reckless imperial impulses provoked by Brexit. We
conclude by considering what lessons can be learned from the Brexit
experience concerning the role of law in general and human rights
guarantees in particular as the constitutional conversations about a
united Ireland gather momentum.
II. BREXIT, EMPIRE NOSTALGIA, AND THE PEACE PROCESS
On the one hand, Brexit is fueled by fantasies of “Empire 2.0”, a
reconstructed global mercantilist trading empire in which old
white colonies will be reconnected to the mother country. On the
other, it is an insurgency and therefore needs to imagine that it is
a revolt against intolerable oppression. It therefore requires both a
sense of superiority and a sense of grievance. Self-pity is the only
emotion that can bring them together. 20

A detailed analysis of the political origins of Brexit and the
success of the Leave Campaign is beyond the space available here.
Such a discussion would include unpicking the complex interplay
between English nationalism and English national imagination,
populism, structural exclusion in the neo-liberal global economy,
xenophobia, the cumulative influence of a largely anti-EU press over
several decades, opportunistic venture capitalism, “dark money” and
Russian interference in the campaign, the complacency of the British
political establishment and the lure of British nostalgia for empire. 21 In
this Article, we have chosen to focus on the imperial nostalgia element
as being the most useful in offering insights into the attitude of
Brexiteers to the Irish peace process. Of course, at one level, the fact
that English nationalists didn’t care/weren’t interested in Northern
Ireland in pressing for Brexit is not entirely surprising. It has long been
a truism of politics in Northern Ireland (admitted mostly only in private
by unionists) that there is limited interest or understanding in Britain of

20. FINTAN O’TOOLE, HEROIC FAILURE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF PAIN 3 (2018).
21. See generally ARRON BANKS, THE BAD BOYS OF BREXIT: TALES OF MISCHIEF,
MAYHEM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE EU REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN (2016); HAROLD
CLARKE ET AL., BREXIT: WHY BRITAIN VOTED TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017);
GEOFFREY EVANS & ANAND MENON, BREXIT & BRITISH POLITICS (2017); DANNY DORLING
& SALLY TOMLINSON, RULE BRITANNIA: BREXIT & THE END OF EMPIRE (2019);
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA ANALYTICS
IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 7 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/action-wevetaken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final20181105.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WJC-G3EJ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
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the complex politics of this island. 22 There have been periodic episodes
when Northern Ireland featured prominently in British politics,
including those related to particular security crises during the conflict,
key moments of the peace process, and (as recently) when the
arithmetic at Westminster meant that the Northern Ireland votes
mattered to governments with a thin majority. However, as Catterall
and McDougall have argued, one constant of British policy has been to
marginalize as far as possible the place of Northern Ireland in British
politics. 23 Taking such a lack of curiosity as a given, we would
nonetheless argue that Brexit has thrown into sharp relief some
previously obscured imperial dimensions to the relationship.
For current purposes, we propose that at least three interrelated
empire nostalgia themes impacted directly on the peace process. These
were the blind spots in Britain with regard to the consequences of
Brexit in Ireland, 24 the curious political footwork involved in framing
the former imperial power as a victim of EU entrapment, and the
particular version of sovereignty asserted in the Brexit mantra to “take
back control.” 25 This Article will not deploy a colonial or post-colonial
lens to analyze politics in Northern Ireland per se. 26 Rather, we use this
perspective to better understand British disregard for the Irish peace
process.
In the short time since the Brexit referendum, there has been
significant discussion in the more left-leaning press in the United
Kingdom and Ireland about the relationship between Brexit and
memory of the empire. While some of this criticism is undoubtedly
“saddling Brexit” with “as much odious baggage as its enemies can
muster,” 27 to be fair, the advocates of Brexit have given their critics
rich material with which to work. For example, Boris Johnson (former
Foreign Secretary, now Prime Minister) has deliberately invoked
22. As John Morison frequently reminds us, for a British audience, the “two most boring
words run together in the English language are Northern and Ireland.”
23. THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION IN BRITISH POLITICS 9 (Peter Catterall & Sean
McDougall eds., 1996).
24. Ian Manners, Political Psychology of European Integration: The (Re) Production of
Identity and Difference in the Brexit Debate, 39 POL. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1223 (2018).
25. See generally Andrew Gamble (2018) Taking Back Control: The Political
Implications of Brexit, 25 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1215 (2018).
26. For competing accounts of the utility of such an approach to understanding Northern
Ireland, SEE BRENDAN O’LEARY, A TREATISE ON NORTHERN IRELAND: COLONIALISM (2019);
LIAM KENNEDY, COLONIALISM, RELIGION & NATIONALISM IN IRELAND (1996).
27. Stuart Ward & Astrid Rasch, Introduction Greater Britain Global Britain, in EMBERS
OF EMPIRE IN BREXIT BRITAIN 4 (Stuart Ward & Astrid Rasch eds., 2019).
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Britain’s imperial past—appealing directly to the ingenuity of a people
“who used to run the biggest empire the world has ever seen.” 28 As
discussed further below, leading Brexiteer Member of Parliament
(“MP”), Jacob Rees-Mogg, published a book in 2019 titled “The
Victorians,” celebrating prominent British figures led by the woman he
describes as “Her Imperial Majesty Queen Victoria.” In his view, they
comprised a generation “who had confidence in their civilizing effort,
a belief in the goodness of their own nation and the drive necessary to
finish the job.” 29 In the short time since the Leave Campaign got
underway, a rich sociological, political and anthropological literature
has emerged linking the growth of Euroscepticism in Britain with
imperial nostalgia, culminating in the Brexit vote. 30
The practical expressions of Euroscepticism in Britain have been
evident in Britain for decades. Although it was founded in 1957, the
United Kingdom declined to join the European Economic Community
(“EEC,” a predecessor to the European Union) until 1973. 31 In the
subsequent 1975 European referendum, support for EEC membership
was relatively high, with a majority of 62.7% voting that the United
Kingdom should stay in the EEC and a minority of 32.8% voting to
leave. 32 Despite this initial majority support, segments of the two
largest UK political parties (Conservatives and Labour) have remained
“ambivalent or hostile to European integration.” 33 A former
Conservative British Prime wrote after leaving power that “Europe as
a whole is fundamentally unreformable,” continuing later that the
European Union is “a classic utopian project, a monument to the vanity
of intellectuals, a programme whose inevitable destiny is failure.”34
This political wariness was evidenced in the United Kingdom’s
somewhat semi-detached approach to the European Union, as reflected
28. Boris Johnson, Opinion, There is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want: Leave
the
EU,
THE
TELEGRAPH,
March
16,
2016,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/03/16/boris-johnson-exclusive-there-is-only-oneway-to-get-the-change/ [https://perma.cc/Y6LS-WNNT].
29. JACOB REES-MOGG, THE VICTORIANS xvii (2019).
30. See generally BENJAMIN GROB-FITZGIBBON, CONTINENTAL DRIFT: BRITAIN &
EUROPE FROM THE END OF EMPIRE TO THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM (2016).
31. Andrew Gardner, Brexit, Boundaries & Imperial Identities: A Comparative View, 17
32. See results at: Richard Nelson, Archive: How the Guardian Reported the 1975 EEC
Referendum, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/from-thearchive-blog/2015/jun/05/referendum-eec-europe-1975 [https://perma.cc/8YC4-74E8].
33. Gardner, supra note 31, at 5.
34. MARGARET THATCHER, STATECRAFT: STRATEGIES FOR A CHANGING WORLD 320,
359 (2002).
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in its successfully negotiated opt-outs to the Euro currency, the
“Schengen area” (obviating the need for passports and border controls
within twenty-six EU countries), and a number of Justice and Home
Affairs measures. 35 Within British politics, the emergence in 1993 of
the single issue United Kingdom Independence Party (“UKIP” recently
usurped by the Brexit Party) made the management of the Eurosceptic
wing of the Tory party all the more challenging—what former Prime
Minister David Cameron has referred to as “the Nigel Farage Factor”
(the ubiquitous leader of first UKIP, then the Brexit party). 36 This in
turn contributed significantly to Cameron’s decision to commit to a
campaign pledge of an in/out referendum on EU membership in the
2015 general election. 37
At a theoretical level, the relationship between Euroscepticism
and the imperial afterlife in the collective English imagination is of
course quite complex. For some commentators, the most interesting
element was the Leave Campaign’s “tendency to romanticise the days
of the British Empire, a time when Britannia ruled the waves and was
defined by her racial and cultural superiority.” 38 When Prime Minister
Theresa May gave her first speech after the leave vote, she referred to
“global Britain” no less than twelve times. 39 In 2017, when the
Secretary of State for International Development, Liam Fox, traveled
to former African colonies (now members of the British
Commonwealth) to boost post-Brexit trade links, it was the staff from
his office who branded the visits as “Empire 2.0.” 40 For others, the
35. See generally JULIE SMITH, THE UK’S JOURNEYS INTO AND OUT OF THE EU (2018).
36. CAMERON supra note 2, at 511.
37. See generally ANDREW GLENCROSS, WHY THE UK VOTED FOR BREXIT: DAVID
CAMERON’S GREAT MISCALCULATION (2018).
38. Nadine El-Enany, Brexit is Not Only an Expression of Nostalgia for Empire, it is also
the Fruit of Empire, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/11/brexit-is-not-only-an-expression-of-nostalgia-forempire-it-is-also-the-fruit-of-empire/ [https://perma.cc/4XKK-PEW6]. One vox pop TV
interviewee, seemed to capture this mood well when he said, “We’re British. We stood alone for
years. I was watching a thing with the Queen, there was billions of people in the Empire. Let’s
get back to being a British Empire again . . . [t]hat’s what it’s all about, you know? It’s about
being a British Empire.” News Report, Leave Voter: ‘Let’s be a British Empire Again,’ SKY
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2018), https://news.sky.com/video/lets-get-back-to-being-a-british-empire11530606 [https://perma.cc/AE4J-GDVT].
39. Theresa May, The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM
Speech,
PRIME
MINISTER’S
OFFICE
(Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.gov.uk
[https://perma.cc/Y9FA-F2WF].
40. Sam Coates, Ministers Aim to Build “Empire 2.0” With African Commonwealth,
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ministers-aim-to-build-empire-2-0-
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yearning for past greatness—what Paul Gilroy has termed the “aching
loss” of empire 41—was skillfully wedded by Brexiteers to promises of
a post-Brexit utopia wherein the health service would be better funded
by money that would otherwise be absorbed by the European Union
and a plethora of new trade deals would transform communities hard
hit by austerity. 42 Even less savory were the undoubtedly racialized
efforts by the Leave Campaign to frame migrant workers as a threat to
the white working classes and to brand people of color more generally
as undesirables and potential terrorists who were committed to entering
Britain because of what Nigel Farage termed “the EU’s open
borders.” 43
Some of those involved in the Leave Campaign have been quite
honest about how little Northern Ireland and the peace process featured
in the Brexit deliberations. 44 This Article holds that this “blind spot”
had undoubted imperial dimensions. The imperial gaze is inevitably
drawn to the farthest horizon of the empire. It is the scale, reach,
distance and “otherness” of the lands and people who fall under the
control of an empire—what Homi Bhabha calls the relationship
between “cultural difference and colonial nonsense”—that reinforces

with-african-commonwealth-after-brexit-v9bs6f6z9 [https://perma.cc/23DS-GJSZ]. See also
DAVID THACKERAY & RICHARD TOYE, EMBERS OF EMPIRE IN BREXIT BRITAIN 15 (Stuart
Ward & Astrid Rasch eds., 2019).
41. PAUL GILROY, AFTER EMPIRE; MELANCHOLIA OR CONVIVIAL CULTURE? 95 (2004).
42. See Craig Calhoun, Populism, Nationalism and Brexit in BREXIT SOCIOLOGICAL
RESPONSES (William Outwaite ed., 2017) at 60. See also Arshad Isakjee & Colin Lorne, Bad
News From Nowhere: Race, Class and the “Left Behind” 37 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING C:
POL. AND SPACE 1, 7 (2019).
43. See Macer Hall, Cut Ties With Brussels or Risk Being Trapped in a Turkish-Dominated
EU,
Warns
Farage,
DAILY
EXPRESS
(Apr.
22,
2016),
https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/665771/nigel-farage-eu-referendum-brexit-turkeyleave-vote-speech [https://perma.cc/4Q7S-N4ME]. one infamous Leave campaign poster
pictured Middle Eastern refugees queuing at the EU borders with a strap line that read, “We
must break free of the EU and take back control.” See Satnam Virdee & Brendan McGeever,
Racism, Crisis, Brexit, 41 J. ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 1802, 1802 (2017). Unattributed, EU
referendum: Nigel Farage Tells Leave Campaign to Focus on Migration, BBC NEWS (Apr. 29,
2016),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36167329
[https://perma.cc/NLX3-4GPB].
44. As one former Vote Leave staffer has written, “Those of us who made the case for
leaving the European Union did not sufficiently take into account the interests of Northern
Ireland, nor indeed did we estimate the significance of the role played by the Border within the
Brexit negotiations . . .” Oliver Norgrove, Why Brexiteers Forgot About the Border, IRISH
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2019) https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/why-brexiteers-forgot-about-theborder-1.3831635 [https://perma.cc/NF5J-CRAQ].
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the superiority of those who rule and administer it. 45 Ireland was
Britain’s oldest and closest colony. We would argue further that the
duration and proximity of the colonial relationship with Ireland—”the
tall kingdom over your shoulder” as the poet Seamus Heaney described
it—helps explain the oversight. 46 Ireland’s relative smallness,
superficial “sameness,” yet dreary complexity and durable conflict all
contributed to Ireland being literally overlooked in the expansive Brexit
imperial fantasy. 47
Ireland has also become enmeshed with the Brexit-inspired notion
of Britain as a victim of colonialism. In the wake of the referendum,
particularly as the realization that the Irish border had assumed a
pivotal position in preventing getting Brexit done, 48 Ireland became an
increasing source of irritation and exasperation for those who wished
to cut free from the entanglements of the European Union. As late as
January 2019, despite over two and a half years of negotiation, Boris
Johnson continued to assert that the Irish border problem was “easily
capable of solution.” 49 In reality, however, the border came to
symbolize the ways in which the breezy self-confidence of leading
Brexiteers was being thwarted by the real-world complexities of
unpicking multi-tiered legal, economic, financial, institutional and
diplomatic relationships developed over more than four decades.
Frustrated by the unanticipated complexity of leaving the European
Union, leading Brexiteers repeatedly cast Britain as a victim of EU
45. HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE chapt. 7 (1994). See generally
BERNARD PORTER THE LION’S SHARE; A HISTORY OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM 1850-2011
(2012); SHASHI THAROOR INGLORIOUS EMPIRE; WHAT DID THE BRITISH DO IN INDIA (2017).
For a more sympathetic account, see NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE; HOW BRITAIN MADE THE
MODERN WORLD (2003).
46. This phrase is used by Seamus Heaney in his poem Act of Union published in the
collection NORTH (1975). Seamus Heaney, Act of Union, in NORTH (1975).
47. Winston Churchill, an unapologetic imperialist, famously opined that, as one looked
across the radically altered landscapes after World War One, “Europe has changed. The position
of countries has changed . . . but as the deluge subsides and the waters fall, we see the dreary
steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few
institutions that had been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world.” PAUL BEW,
CHURCHILL AND IRELAND 113 (2016). For an interesting discussion on Ireland historical place
within British view of empire see STEPHEN HOWE, IRELAND AND EMPIRE chapt. 5 (2001).
48. See generally Katy Hayward, The Pivotal Position of the Irish Border in the UK’s
Withdrawal from the European Union 22 SPACE AND POLITY 238 (2018).
49. Political Staff, Solution to Irish Border Backstop Problem is an Easy One: Boris
Johnson,
BELFAST
TELEGRAPH
(June
15,
2019),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/solution-to-irish-border-backstopproblem-is-an-easy-one-boris-johnson-38220922.html [https://perma.cc/4EHS-T5QU].
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colonialism. 50 Fintan O’Toole has insightfully and wittily captured the
curious psycho-political rationale at play in the framing of Britain’s
membership of the European Union as the painful submission of a
once-great colonial power to the clamps of the EU empire. 51 The Irish
government’s insistence upon a legally binding “backstop” in the 2017
Agreement in order to avoid a hard border in Ireland—which for many
Brexiteers was to risk continued colonial entrapment—was beyond
infuriating. One particularly naïve alternative offered by the former
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer and chair of the Leave
Campaign, Sir Nigel Lawson, was that the Irish Republic would “say
we made a mistake in getting independence in 1922, and come back
within the United Kingdom. That would be great.” 52
Brexiteers have also engaged in an inversion of what Bhabha has
termed mimicry - except in this case the former colonizer adapts and
utilizes the language and tactics of the historically subaltern (the Irish)
and “ . . . appropriates the other as it visualizes power.” 53 In reaching
for historic analogies for noble efforts at resistance to the colonial yoke
of the European Union, Brexiteers have drawn approvingly from Irish
republican history. Brexiteer Member of the European Parliament,
Daniel Hannan, in rationalizing his approval of a compromise proposal
from Theresa May in 2018, likened Theresa May’s 2018 compromise
proposal to the stance taken by the pro-Treaty Irish Republican Army
(“IRA”) in “grabb[ing] what looked like an imperfect independence

50. See for example BBC News Report, UK Must Not be EU “Colony” After Brexit (Dec.
16, 2017). In his resignation letter from Theresa May’s cabinet before successfully running to
replace her, Boris Johnson stated, that Britain was “headed ‘for the status of a colony.’” See
Heather Stewart, Pippa Crerar, & Dan Sabbagh, May’s Plan ‘Sticks in the Throat,’ Says Boris
Johnson
as
He
Resigns
Over
Brexit,
GUARDIAN
(July
9,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/09/boris-johnson-resigns-as-foreign-secretarybrexit [https://perma.cc/QU8Q-MK8P].
51. O’Toole states that: “The political erotics of the imaginary domination and imaginary
submission are the deep pulse of the Brexit psychodrama . . . In the bondage games of the
playing out in the English reactionary imagination, Britain has spent forty-five years hanging
from the ceiling in the Red Room of Pain, with clamps on its nipples and a gag in its mouth.”
O’TOOLE, supra note 20, at 25.
52. Lord Nigel, Lawson Hopes Irish Republic Realizes its “Mistake” and Rejoins UK
Following Brexit NEWSTALK (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.newstalk.com/news/lord-nigellawson-hopes-irish-republic-realises-its-mistake-and-rejoins-uk-following-brexit-612949
[https://perma.cc/C8NS-68WF].
53. BHABHA, supra note 45, at 86. Bhabha uses mimicry to describe the ways in which
the colonised sometimes appropriate the language, mores, values etc. of imperial power, albeit
subverting its power at the same time. See id. chapt. 4.
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and then buil[ding] on it rather than risking the entire process.” 54 In a
similar vein, hardline Tory Brexiteer MP, Owen Patterson, 55 quoted
from a 1921 speech by the pro-Treaty IRA leader Michael Collins to
rationalize his acceptance of the Johnson compromise in October
2019. 56 The irony of Brexiteers casting Britain as the victim of EU
colonialism and then drawing inspiration from previous IRA leaders to
justify their escape plans has not surprisingly generated some mirth in
Ireland. 57
The third related imperial dimension to the relationship between
the Brexit project and the Irish peace process is the version of
sovereignty promoted by Brexiteers. Sovereignty within the Brexit
project is encapsulated in the Leave slogan “take back control.” 58 As
Freeden and others have argued, making this the center-piece was key
to the success of the campaign. 59 There is, of course, a rich
interdisciplinary literature on the concept of sovereignty across law,
politics, sociology, and other disciplines, and indeed a rich stream of
scholarship specifically on sovereignty and the European Union. 60 For
54. Daniel Staunton, Brexit: Two Tory Vice-chairs Quit Roles Over Chequers Agreement’,
IRISH TIMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/brexit-two-tory-vicechairs-quit-roles-over-chequers-agreement-1.3560520 [https://perma.cc/N2AE-6VCN].
55. Political Report, In Full: Former Tory Minister Owen Paterson’s Letter Calling for
Theresa May No Confidence Vote, SKY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2018) https://news.sky.com/story/infull-former-tory-minister-owen-patersons-letter-calling-for-theresa-may-no-confidence-vote11578383 [https://perma.cc/KVJ9-LS35]. Owen Paterson, Why I Lost Faith in Theresa May –
Owen Paterson’s Remarkable Letter of No Confidence in Full, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/12/11/have-handed-letter-no-confidence-primeminister/ [https://perma.cc/58RG-D6JB].
56. Paterson stated: “Michael Collins said something in Dáil Éireann on 19 December
1921 that pretty reflects much reflects my views this evening.” He then quoted Collins directly:
“In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop
to, but the freedom to achieve it.” Hansard HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE, Oct. 22, 2019, Vol
666, Col 893.
57. See Ronan McGreevy, Parnell and now Michael Collins – What’s With Tory
Brexiteers
Quoting
Irish
Heroes?,
IRISH
TIMES
(Oct.
23,
2019)
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/parnell-and-now-michael-collins-what-swith-tory-brexiteers-quoting-irish-heroes-1.4060216 [https://perma.cc/23ZX-UCSY]. Fintan
O’Toole, Brexiters Evoking Ireland’s Civil War Should be Careful What They Wish For,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
5,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/05/brexiters-ireland-civil-wartroubled-past [https://perma.cc/CL25-33FM].
58. See Gamble supra note 25, at 1218.
59. Michael Freeden, After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,
22 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 1, 5-8 (2017).
60. For a useful overview, see generally DIETER GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND
FUTURE OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT (2015); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
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current purposes, we are most interested in the ways in which what
King has called “sovereignty hysteria” 61 illustrated by the claim that
leaving the European Union would amount to “Independence Day” for
the United Kingdom, 62 resonated with imperial and popular notions of
sovereignty rather than the complex legal understanding of the term
which most UK constitutional lawyers have become familiar since
devolution (discussed further below in the concluding section). Indeed
we would argue that sovereignty has been deployed politically in the
Brexit debate as a populist imperial slogan—”the will of the
people” 63—deliberating obfuscating distinctions between internal and
external notions of sovereignty, parliamentary sovereignty, and the
national sovereignty of the United Kingdom as a state engaging in
supranational and international relationships. 64 Although the primacy
of parliamentary sovereignty featured heavily in Brexiteer slogans
during the campaign, as parliament proved a major obstacle to
implementing the Brexit vision, it was ultimately and unlawfully
prorogued by the Johnson administration. 65 Popular sovereignty, as
expressed through the narrow Leave victory, has been interpreted by
pro-Brexit advocates as a one off expression of the will of the people
and they have fought a relentless and successful campaign against a
second referendum wherein the detail of the deal agreed with the
European Union and its economic and political consequences could be
considered in a final referendum. 66
From such a vantage point, the refusal by the Irish government
and the other twenty-six EU member states to countenance a hard
border in Ireland in order to facilitate Brexit has been an abrogation of
the sovereignty of the people in Britain. A key complicating factor, and
61. See further Michael Gordon, The UK’s Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment
and Beyond, 27 KING’S L. J. 333, 334 (2016).
62. Jon Stone, EU Referendum: Boris Johnson Says Thursday Could Become Britain’s
“Independence Day”, INDEPENDENT (June 21, 2016).
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-boris-johnson-independenceday-live-debate-bbc-vote-leave-brexit-remain-a7094531.html [https://perma.cc/NZ6W-RT2B].
Yasmeen Serhan, Ready or Not, a New Independence Day Awaits the U.K., ATLANTIC,
(February 27, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/uk-preparebrexit-day-march-29-eu/583630/ [https://perma.cc/Z6RZ-G8XY].
63. For a more benign reading, see generally Vernon Bogdanor, Europe and the
Sovereignty of the People, 87 POL. Q, 348 (2016).
64. See Gordon, supra note 61, at 335.
65. Id. at 56.
66. See also Christopher Bickerton, Parliamentary, Popular and Pooled: Conflicts of
Sovereignty in the United Kingdom’s Exit from the European Union, 41 J. EUR. INTEGRATION,
887 (2019).
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one with an obvious colonial dimension, is that this fails to take account
of the fact that fifty-six percent of the people of Northern Ireland voted
remain in the Brexit referendum. 67 Former British Prime Minister,
Margaret Thatcher, famously declared in 1981 that Northern Ireland
was as much a part of the United Kingdom as her own constituency of
Finchley. 68 Echoing this, Boris Johnson has compared the Irish border
to the boundaries between different boroughs of London. 69 Of course,
Northern Ireland is neither Finchley nor Camden. The entire peace
process is premised on the uniqueness of Northern Ireland. The
requirement for a devolved Assembly with bespoke voting
requirements for cross-community consent, the North South
Ministerial Council between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and all
of the other elements of the complex constitutional architecture of the
Good Friday Agreement speak to the post-conflict need for what
Anthony has termed a “diffuse conception of sovereignty” 70 Having
explored the ways in which “empire nostalgia” illuminates the Brexit
crisis, we now consider the detailed out-workings of Brexit with regard
to the peace process in Ireland. To begin, we offer an overview of
Anglo-Irish relations before and after the EU referendum.
III. ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brexit has resulted in what O’Brennan describes as a “reverse
asymmetry” of power in Anglo-Irish relations, with Dublin now
seemingly in the ascendency for the first time ever. 71 It has also
67. See Results and Turnout at the EU Referendum, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION,
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-andreferendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/results-and-turnout-eureferendum [https://perma.cc/J68L-4WXE].
68. Margaret Thatcher’s statement in parliament that “Northern Ireland is part of the UK
- as much as my constituency is” is often misquoted as “Northern Ireland is as British as
Finchley”. Anglo-Irish Bilateral Talks, Debate in the British House of Commons, Nov. 10, 1981,
HANSARD vol. 12, cols. 421-428.
69. Political Report, Boris Johnson Likens Irish Border Challenge to Congestion Charge,
BBC NEWS (Feb.
27,
2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43210156
[https://perma.cc/9RT8-F5FY]. Aidan Lonergan, Boris Johnson Slammed After Comparing
Irish Border to Boundaries Between London Boroughs, IRISH POST, (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.irishpost.com/news/boris-johnson-slammed-comparing-irish-border-boundarieslondon-boroughs-150486 [https://perma.cc/UF3X-DH44].
70. Gordon Anthony, Sovereignty, Consent and Constitutions: The Northern Ireland
References in THE UK CONSTITUTION AFTER MILLER: BREXIT AND BEYOND 200 (Mark Elliott,
Jack Williams & Alison L. Young eds., 2018).
71. John O’Brennan, Requiem for a Shared Interdependent Past: Brexit and the
Deterioration in UK-Irish Relations, 43 CAPITAL & CLASS 157 (2019).
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significantly emboldened both northern and southern variants of Irish
nationalism, reenergizing discussions on Irish unity that were assumed
to be largely settled under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. 72 In a
remarkable reversal of policy, key figures in the Irish center-right have
stated publicly that constitutional change must now be considered. For
example, former Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, told the BBC
in 2017 that, “[t]en years ago I would have thought that a united Ireland
was a very distant possibility, now I think it’s more of a real
possibility.” 73 This rupturing of Anglo-Irish relations in the wake of
Brexit has inevitably begged questions about the depth of Britain’s
underlying commitment to the peace process. 74 Although the joint
stewardship approach first formally enshrined in the 1985 Anglo-Irish
Agreement by Margaret Thatcher and Garret Fitzgerald was motivated
in large part by security considerations, 75 few would question the
sincerity of the investment in the peace process by successive British
governments, most notably the Labour administration led by Tony
Blair. The ease with which Brexit has diminished collective British
memory of that investment, and the likely repercussions, is
perplexing. 76 Given the pace and complexity of the political,
parliamentary and constitutional debates provoked by Brexit, it is
fiendishly difficult to grasp the underlying dynamics of change.
A generous reading of the British government’s shift in policy
calls attention to a generational gap: only one-sixth of current
Westminster MPs were present when the Good Friday Agreement was
72. Interview with republican activist, South Armagh, May 24, 2018.
73. Ajay Nair, Brexit Makes a United Ireland “A Real Possibility”, Warns Former Irish
Justice Minister, EXPRESS (May 12, 2017),
https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/803911/United-Ireland-real-possibility-warns-formerIrish-Justice-Minister-Michael-McDowell-bbc [https://perma.cc/UEP2-JL6C].
74. See Katy Hayward & Mary C. Murphy, The EU’s Influence on the Peace Process and
Agreement in Northern Ireland in Light of Brexit, 17 ETHNOPOLITICS 276 (2018); Duncan
Morrow, Walking Away From the Good Friday Agreement may Look Easy. Picking up the
Pieces Will Take Decades, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS BREXIT BLOG SERIES (Feb. 28,
2018),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/02/28/walking-away-from-the-good-fridayagreement-may-look-easy-picking-up-the-pieces-will-take-decades/ [https://perma.cc/SJV5KQB8].
75. See Brendan O’Leary, The Anglo-Irish Agreement: Folly or Statecraft?, 10 WEST
EUR. POL. 5, 5 (1987); ARTHUR AUGHEY & CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN, THE ANGLO-IRISH
AGREEMENT: RETHINKING ITS LEGACY 13 (2011).
76. As the eminent Irish historian, Roy Foster, stated, “Among the many dishonest and
slipshod characteristics of the Leave Campaign was its determined ignoring of the implications
for Northern Ireland.” See Roy Foster, The Return of the Repressed: Roy Foster on Brexit and
“the Irish Question,” TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (July 11, 2017).
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signed in 1998. 77 It also allows for a measure of naivety—the notion
that British MPs firmly believed that the Irish question had been settled.
Fears that a new generation of politicians underestimated the fragility
of what had been achieved prompted former British Prime Ministers,
John Major and Tony Blair, to travel to the Irish border to make a
symbolic joint statement during the 2016 Brexit referendum
campaign. 78 In 2019 they were again moved to warn MPs not to
“wreck” the peace process in Northern Ireland. Blair stated that it was
“a shame and an outrage” that peace in Northern Ireland was being
treated as “some disposable inconvenience to be bartered away in
exchange for satisfying the obsession of the Brexiteers with wrenching
our country out of Europe.” 79
A more scathing interpretation is that the more extreme Brexiteer
members of the British government simply did not care. 80 Bearing in
mind the increasing centrality of “empire nostalgia” in pro-Brexit
discourse discussed above, it was perhaps not too difficult to choose
between risking the peace process in Ireland and the bilateral
relationship with the Irish Republic and escaping from the European
Union. In order to probe the veracity of this admittedly cynical
assessment, it is necessary to recap on the key stages in the Anglo-Irish
relationship, and in particular, on the role of the European Union
therein.
There is a general consensus that Anglo-Irish relations in the
decades following partition were largely characterized by a “failure of
77. Leaving the DUP aside, only 105 of more than 600 remaining Westminster MPs were
present when the GFA was signed in 1998. See Jonathan Freedland, Peace in Ireland is Precious.
Brexit
Has
Made
Us
Forget
That,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
4,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/04/peace-ireland-brexit-boris-johnsongood-friday-agreement [https://perma.cc/T4UG-W3BR].
78. Heather Stewart, Tony Blair and John Major: Brexit Would Close Irish Border,
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/09/tony-blair-andjohn-major-brexit-would-close-irish-border
[https://perma.cc/9XBT-US3T].
Jayne
McCormack, Brexit: How the Irish Border Issue was Viewed During Campaigning, BBC NEWS
(Oct.
12,
2019),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-49988057
[https://perma.cc/M3NF-EAE2].
79. Andrew Woodcock, Brexit: Blair and Major Urge MPs to Block Deal Which
“Threatens Peace Process” in Northern Ireland, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-deal-vote-tony-blair-john-majornorthern-ireland-border-boris-johnson-a9162216.html [https://perma.cc/TER3-Z5KB].
80. Jonathan Freedland argues, “The most charitable explanation is that, after 1998, most
politicians simply considered the issue done, to be filed away. But there’s more to it than that.
The truth is, they were casually dismissive of Ireland because it simply didn’t matter to them.”
Freedland, supra note 77.

2020]

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

627

mutual comprehension” and the capacity to “generate mutual
mistrust.” 81 By the time the “modernizer,” Sean Lemass, came to
power as Taoiseach in 1959 much of the heat had gone out of the “burn
everything British except their coal” attitude that underscored the
“Economic War” of 1932 to 1938. Heralding a new approach to the
issue of partition, Lemass declared in 1963 that, “[w]e see our task now
as reuniting the Irish people, as well as reuniting Irish territory.” 82 With
the outbreak of widespread violence in 1968, however, the fundamental
fragility of both the North-South and Anglo-Irish relationship was laid
bare. Television footage of nationalists being driven out of their homes
in the “Battle of the Bogside” in Derry in August 1969 enraged
moderate opinion in the South and brought increasing pressure to bear
on Lemass’s successor, Jack Lynch. In an effort to demonstrate that he
would no longer “stand by” as Northern nationalists and civil rights
activists were attacked by both loyalists and the police, Lynch
requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council.83
This, together with a disputation of the UK claim to domestic
jurisdiction in Northern Ireland by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, not
surprisingly gave rise to a series of barbed exchanges with British
counterparts. 84 Escalating violence, internment and the imposition of
direct rule all contributed to a further deterioration of diplomatic
relations. The impact of common membership of the EEC became all
the more significant in light of these strains on Anglo-Irish relations. 85

81. Paul Arthur, Anglo-Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Problem, 2 IR. STUD.
INT’L AFF. 37, 37 (1985).
82. NAI: Department of the Taoiseach, S16272 E/63, interview given by Lemass to T. P.
Coogan, (Sept. 5, 1963); Lemass to Horgan, (Oct. 25, 1963) (quoted in ANNA BRYSON, NO
COWARD SOUL: A BIOGRAPHY OF THEKLA BEERE 122 (2009)).
83. In a broadcast on radio and television, Jack Lynch asked the British government to
request a peace-keeping force from the UN as the “RUC is not accepted as an impartial police
force.” He added that: “[i]t is clear also that the Irish government can no longer stand by and see
innocent people injured and perhaps worse.” RTÉ broadcast, Statement by the Taoiseach Mr J.
Lynch NAI DT 2000/6/657, (Aug. 13, 1969).
84. As then Minister of Foreign Affairs, later President, Patrick Hillery told the United
Nations, “[a]lthough we in Ireland have lived for some time with the reality of British control
over the North of our country, we do not in any way concede to them the right to exercise
jurisdiction there.” Patrick J. Hillery, Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Address at UNSC 1503d
mtg, (Aug. 20, 1969).
85. BREXITLAWNI, BREXIT AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS (Sept. 2018),
https://brexitlawni.org/library/resources/policy-report-north-south-relations/
[https://perma.cc/F3XB-AF5L]. See also Edward Burke, Who Will Speak for Northern Ireland?:
The Looming Danger of an Ulster Brexit 161 RUSI J. 4 (Mar. 3, 2016).
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Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Common
Market together in 1973. Former British Prime Ministers, Irish
Taoisigh, foreign ministers and senior officials have all stressed the
importance of the European framework in the evolution and
normalization of British/Irish relations and, in particular, in embedding
a notion of “joint stewardship” of the NI peace process. 86 Ireland now
had a seat on the nine-strong Council of Ministers on an equal footing
with Britain and, for the first time since 1949, Irish and British
ministers, civil servants, and key figures in business, agriculture and
trade unions converged together in Brussels.
There were at least three practical manifestations of the maturing
of the Anglo-Irish relationship. In economic terms, the opening up of
European markets and the cushioning effect of targeted subsidies
gradually lessened the economic dependency of Ireland on Britain that
had persisted since independence and enabled the Irish government to
move into a more confident phase of the political relationship.87
Secondly, the very fact that a cross-section of civil servants and
politicians now had cause to co-operate on issues such as education,
the environment and agriculture enabled the development of important
relationships. Theorists of negotiation have long since acknowledged
the centrality of individual personalities and interpersonal relations.88
In the context of the peace process, it is, for example, significant that
two of its key architects, future Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and
future British Prime Minister, John Major, first become acquainted
through bi-lateral European meetings when Major was the British
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Reynolds was Irish Minister for
Finance. Thirdly, the fact that European meetings provided
opportunities to meet at some physical remove from domestic
parliaments was also significant. In his seminal study of symbolic
politics, Edelman notes that political settings are often plotted and
manipulated to ensure a departure from quotidian political pressures.
In particular, he notes that the gravity of the political setting and the
dramaturgical features of negotiation are important in terms of future
86. See for example, Martin Mansergh, The New Context of British-Irish Relations in
IRELAND IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 97 (Ben Tonra & Eilís Ward eds. 2002).
87. See Brigid Laffan, Ireland: From Interdependence to Dependence, in THE NEW
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE 4 (N. Walton & J. Zielonka eds., 2013).
88. See R. Donley and D.G. Winter, Measuring the Motives of Public Officials at a
Distance, 15 BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE 227 (1970); M.G. Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy
Behaviour Using the Personal Characteristics of Leaders, 24 INT’L STUD. Q. 7 (1980).

2020]

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

629

legitimization with wider audiences. 89 Over time, meetings at EU
summits and the like provided opportunities for separate bilateral
discussions on peace process-related matters between the British Prime
Minister, Irish Taoiseach and other senior politicians and officials. This
developed into what the current Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs has
characterized as “a habit of cooperation.” 90
It is important to acknowledge that Anglo-Irish relations in the
post-EU membership era were hardly problem free. Issues such as
cross-border security, extradition, and alleged collusion between the
security forces and loyalist and republican paramilitaries all created
serious tensions in the relationship. However, the overall gravitational
pull was always to return to negotiation and respectful co-operation on
issues of mutual concern. 91 In contrast to the heated exchanges of the
late 1960s and early 70s, officials in Dublin and London developed
guarded interpersonal trust and an ever-expanding portfolio of
collaboration.
In particular, the British developed a deeper understanding of the
threat that the northern conflict posed to the southern state. This is
reflected in the fact that, until the early 1990s, all major Anglo-Irish
efforts to reach a settlement were premised on the acceptance of a
common enemy (the IRA) and the related principle of refusing to
negotiate with paramilitaries. 92 Secret talks were of course proceeding
behind the scenes (the British held discussions with republicans in 1972
and 1975 and thereafter maintained a secret channel) but, although the
unveiling of these negotiations rattled relations, the fundamental
principle of joint stewardship of the peace process carried forth into the
Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

89. MURRAY EDELMAN, Constructing the Political Spectacle (1988) in CONSTITUTING
RELIGION 91-123 (Tamir Moustafa ed., 2018).
90. See Simon Coveney, Irish Tánaiste, British-Irish Relations – Past, Present and Future,
Tánaiste’s
Speech
at
Chatham
House
(Jan.
31,
2018),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/british-irish-relationship-past-present-and-future
[https://perma.cc/CHS8-QBMX].
91. BREXITLAWNI, BREXIT AND THE PEACE PROCESS (Sept. 2018),
https://brexitlawni.org/assets/uploads/Brexit-and-the-Peace-Process.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SAC-29N5].
92. Eamonn O’Kane, Anglo-Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Peace Process:
From Exclusion to Inclusion, 18 CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 78, 78 (2006). Garret
Fitzgerald was quite open in his pronouncements about what he perceived to be the need to arrest
the growth of Sinn Féin and to restore the standing of the more moderate SDLP. See for example,
GARETT FITZGERALD, ALL IN A LIFE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 473-474 (1991).
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The blossoming of the Anglo-Irish relationship in the decades
after 1998 was reflected in numerous grand gestures, not least the visit
of Queen Elizabeth to Dublin Castle in May 2011. In stark contrast to
the angry exchanges of the late 1960s, she celebrated “the ties between
our people, the shared values, and the economic, business and cultural
links that make us so much more than just neighbors, that make us firm
friends and equal partners.” 93 The Irish President Mary McAleese in
turn noted that the importance of the British and Irish governments
“deepening engagement as equal partners in the European Union” in
improving relations. 94
In spite of the apparent depth of and firmness of this friendship
and trust, it is clear that Brexit has succeeded in driving a wedge
between Britain and Ireland, at the level of politics, diplomacy and civil
society. 95 On the face of it, all of the key actors stress their ongoing
commitment to the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process.
Throughout the Brexit campaign, the Irish government has made clear
its profound concerns regarding the potential impact on peace. 96 Albeit
less forcefully, senior British politicians and officials have also voiced
concern for the peace process and pledge to honor commitments made
in 1998. For example, in her March 29 letter triggering Article 50, then
Prime Minister, Theresa May, acknowledged her responsibility to
“make sure that nothing is done to jeopardize the peace process in
Northern Ireland, and to continue to uphold the Belfast Agreement.”97
Such statements have, however, proved increasingly incompatible with
parallel commitments to prioritize “global Britain” and “get Brexit

93. See video: The Queen in Ireland: Dublin Castle speech in full, THE TELEGRAPH (May
18, 2011), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/queen-elizabeth-II/8522318/The-Queenin-Ireland-Dublin-Castle-speech-in-full.html [https://perma.cc/KN4B-KN7S].
94. See Text of President Mary McAleese’s Dublin Castle Speech, IRISH ECHO (May 25,
2011),
https://www.irishecho.com/2011/05/text-of-president-mary-mcaleeses-dublin-castlespeech/ [https://perma.cc/XM4T-FC47].
95. See generally John O’Brennan, Requiem for a Shared Interdependent Past: Brexit and
the Deterioration in UK-Irish Relations, 43 CAPITAL & CLASS 157 (2019).
96. See video: Enda Kenny and Theresa May Hold Joint Press Conference in Dublin,
IRISH TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/enda-kenny-and-theresa-may-holdjoint-press-conference-in-dublin-1.2957203 [https://perma.cc/7QK4-JT64]; Enda Kenny, Why
Ireland is so Fearful of our Closest Neighbour Leaving the EU, GUARDIAN, (June 20, 2016),
https://www/theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/20/ireland-fearful-neighbour-leavingeu-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/4XV5-MXAM].
97. Letter from Theresa May, UK Prime Minister, to Donald Tusk, European Council
President, (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministersletter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50 [https://perma.cc/4H7X-U52Z].
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done.” 98 We have noted above that there is a growing consensus that a
resurgence of English nationalism is at the heart of the issue and we
considered the root cause of this in light of various facets of empire
nostalgia. 99 A key related question in the context of Anglo-Irish
relations and the Irish peace process concerns the extent to which
Brexit unmasked an essentially superficial commitment to peace on the
part of the British state.
A classical realist perspective on the current British government’s
apparent disregard for the Good Friday Agreement would suggest that
there is nothing particularly surprising in the realignment of state policy
in line with state interests. 100 Viewed in this light, it is logical that,
when the concerns of the Irish peace process chimed with Britain’s
security, economic and political concerns, it assumed joint custody.
Later, as noted above, when the need to satisfy the demands to “get
Brexit done” jarred with these commitments, the Irish peace process
was reassigned to the “tail of the dog.” 101 It is important to note that the
Irish government’s recent pronouncements on Irish unity can also be
viewed through the prism of what (to paraphrase James C. Scott) might
be dubbed as “seeing like a state.” 102 Thus, for example, when the Irish
Republican Army’s campaign was deemed to threaten peace and
security in the Republic, government policy was resolutely anti-Sinn
98. As noted above, when Prime Minister Theresa May gave her first speech after the leave
vote, she referred to “global Britain” no less than twelve times. Theresa May, The Government’s
Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM speech, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.gov.uk [https://perma.cc/JJ99-YVJZ]. May was replaced as Prime Minister
by Boris Johnson who pledged to “get Brexit done.” Martyn Brown, Respect the Will of the
People
and
Let’s
Move
On,
DAILY
EXPRESS
(Oct.
19,
2019),
https://www.pressreader.com/uk/daily-express/20191019/281479278187573 [https://perma.cc/
C8R4-W8F9].
99. See, e.g., Fintan O’Toole, Brexit is Being Driven by English Nationalism. And it Will
End
in
Self-Rule,
GUARDIAN
(June
19,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/18/england-eu-referendum-brexit
[https://perma.cc/859K-HXGD]. John Denham, Nationalism in England is Not Just a Rightwing
Nostalgia
Trip,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
13,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/13/english-nationalism-brexit-remainand-reform [https://perma.cc/4AEN-DYGC].
100. The role of realism in political theory has been diversely theorized by scholars
including Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche and Weber. For our purposes we posit realism simply
as the explanation of political change based on the assumption that power is the primary dynamic
of political behavior and that nation states will inevitably act to maximize and defend their selfinterest. See generally HANS MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1951).
101. See supra note 11.
102. See generally james c. scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve
the Human Condition Have Failed (1999).

632

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:3

Féin—with the Irish government maintaining a much tougher line than
their British counterparts on the issue of “talking to terrorists.”103
Arguably what has changed in the context of Brexit is that the Irish
state’s economic and political priorities now align more closely with
the prospect of a united Ireland than with partition.
Whilst state-centric impulses may go some way towards
explaining the current state of Anglo-Irish relations, they do not
adequately account for the scale of the vitriol that has been unleashed.
As the Irish government, buoyed up by its allies in Europe, dug in its
heels and held firm in the Brexit negotiations, a torrent of anti-Irish
sentiment was unleashed. David Yelland, a former editor of the
famously nationalistic British tabloid newspaper, The Sun, tweeted in
July 2019:
I’ve been shocked at two dinners recently when Tories of influence
have told me privately “Varadkar isn’t bright” and “the Irish will
blink” and it seems, amazingly, that this is the actual policy of
HMG under Johnson. They are anti-Irish, arrogant, dangerous and
wrong. 104

Regardless of the source of such views, Brexit has undoubtedly
placed a considerable strain on carefully nurtured relationships
between the British and Irish governments. It remains the publicly
stated desire of both governments to protect this relationship but a key
challenge will be to either devise new mechanisms or improve or
rejuvenate existing structures to ensure that the “habit of [Anglo-Irish]
cooperation” and a shared sense of responsibility are maintained during
and after Brexit. 105 We have considered thus far the ways in which EU
membership indirectly facilitated Anglo-Irish co-operation and the
advancement of peace in Northern Ireland. In the next section, we

103. In spite of unionist and loyalist protestations that the Republic provided a “safe haven
for terrorists,” the Irish government historically held a much tougher line with republicans than
either Northern Ireland or British authorities. See Brian Hanley, “But Then They Started All This
Killing”: Attitudes to the IRA in the Irish Republic since 1969, 38 IRISH HISTORICAL STUD. 439
(2013).
104. David
Yelland
(@davidyelland),
TWITTER
(July
29,
2019),
https://www.twitter.com/davidyelland/status/1155890580884512770?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/6E8J-6M4S].
105. Coveney, supra note 90. In this 2018 Speech the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Simon Coveney, stated that, whereas the habits of cooperation around the EU table
will be lost, the two governments will now have to “use our existing bilateral mechanisms to
great effect.” Id.
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consider in more detail the European Union’s direct involvement in the
peace process before and after the Brexit referendum.
IV. THE EU AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS
Besides facilitating Anglo-Irish cooperation in the emerging
peace process, the European Union in time became a direct contributor.
The origins of direct EU engagement in the NI peace process can be
traced at least to the late 1970s. In 1979 then the leader of the Social
and Democratic Labour Party (“SDLP”), John Hume, encouraged the
European Parliament to produce a report on the NI conflict. 106 The
document called for a coordinated British-Irish approach—a
forerunner of the joint stewardship principle that underpinned all
subsequent peace agreements. Indeed the Anglo-Irish Agreement—
which provided the template for precisely such a joint approach—
referred to the EEC in its preamble and drew significantly from the
language, findings, and recommendations of the Haagerup Report.107
Following the signing of the Agreement both the European Parliament
and the Council of the European Union formally congratulated the two
governments on the achievement. To further underline their support,
the European Union contributed fifteen million European Currency
Units (“ECUs”) (the forerunner to the Euro) in 1989 to the International
Fund for Ireland which was established as a result of the Agreement.108
As Moxon Browne, Hayward and Murphy, and others have
argued, the “European dimension” internationalized and legitimized
the joint British approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland and made
it more difficult for either party to attempt to “go solo” on peace
process-related matters. 109 The 1993 Downing Street Declaration
106. Nils Haagerup, Report Drawn up on Behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the
Situation in Northern Ireland, EUR. PARL. DOC., (COM 1-1526/83).
107. See Katy Hayward, Reiterating National Identities: The European Union Conception
of Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, 41 COOP. CONFL. 261, 262 (2006).
108. See Sean Byrne, Chuck Thiessen, Eyob Fissuh, Cynthia Irvin, & Pauline Tennent,
The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Peace II Fund in Reducing
Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland, 47 INT’L POL. 229 (2010). EU Press Release,
International Fund for Ireland (2006): EP Favours Continued EU Funding, But with New Legal
Basis,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+IMPRESS+20061211IPR01365+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=BG [https://perma.cc/RK95YJSK].
109. See generally Edward Moxon-Browne, The Impact of the European Community, in
NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICS & THE CONSTITUTION (Brigid Hadfield ed., 1992). Katy
Hayward & Mary Murphy, The (Soft) Power of Commitment: The European Union and Conflict
Resolution in Northern Ireland, 11 ETHNOPOLITICS 439, 443 (2012).
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signed by John Major and Albert Reynolds, which paved the way for
the IRA and loyalist ceasefires in 1994, states “the development of
Europe will, of itself, require new approaches to serve interests
common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the
United Kingdom as partners in the European Union.” 110 Following the
ceasefires, the 1995 Framework for Agreement produced by the two
governments made even more significant reference to the importance
of the “European dimension” as a template for enabling the evolving
peace process. 111 In addition, as discussed further below, the 1998
Good Friday Agreement made explicit reference to the European
Union as reflected both in the terms of cooperation in the international
treaty signed by the British and Irish governments and in the working
of the North South Ministerial Council between Northern Ireland and
the Republic. 112
Mindful of the political sensitivities involved in being seen to
“interfere,” the key thrust of EU policy has been to emphasize the link
between improved social and economic conditions and the momentum
towards peace. The original peace funding program—launched in 1994
by European Commission President Jacque Delors—stated that it was
important to “convince those on the ground that the peace process can
yield real dividends to their lives.” 113 Since then, the financial
contribution from the European Union to Northern Ireland and the
border counties has been substantial. In addition to several European
Structural and Investment Programs, there have been three EU Peace
and Reconciliation (“PEACE”) programs—involving a financial
contribution of EUR€1.3 billion from the European Union and the
British and Irish governments. 114 A fourth program (“PEACE IV”) was
110. Joint Declaration by An Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, T.D., and the British Prime
Minister, the Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P., Dec. 15, 1993, para. 3.
111. Paul Teague, The European Union and the Irish Peace Process, 34 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 549, 550 (1996).
112. The Belfast Agreement, U.K.-Ireland, Preamble and Code of Conduct, sec. 17, Apr.
10, 1998.
113. European Commission Press Release IP/94/1165, Delors Peace Package for Northern
Ireland Sent to EC Leaders (Dec. 6, 1994), https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-941165_en.htm [https://perma.cc/8NYF-QUTQ].
114. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COOPERATION PROGRAMMES UNDER THE EUROPEAN
TERRITORIAL
COOPERATION
GOAL
(2016),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/102/northern-ireland-peace-programme
[https://perma.cc/5D7Q-EKTD]. It should be noted that the bulk of the funding comes from the
EU, for example, see Jodie Carson & Colin Pidgeon, European Funding in Northern Ireland,
NORTHERN
IRELAND
ASSEMBLY
(Aug.
20,
2010),
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launched in January 2016—with a total value of EUR€270 million.115
These programs are broadly aimed at ensuring “cohesion between
communities involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland and the border
counties of Ireland; [and] economic and social stability.” 116 They have
funded investment programs, cross-community and cross-border
initiatives, urban and rural regeneration schemes, shared spaces and
services, and initiatives designed to nurture positive relations at a local
level. 117 Additionally, the border regions in Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland have benefitted from the EU INTERREG program.
This aims to support “cross-border co-operation for a more prosperous
and sustainable region,” by addressing “the economic and social
problems resulting from the existence of borders”. 118 Since 1991,
EUR€1.13 billion has come into the Border region as a result of this
program and the INTERREG VA Program for 2014-2020 is worth
EUR€283 million. 119
Given the scale of its investment to date, it is not surprising that
EU officials have expressed concern about the potential impact of
Brexit on the peace process. In a joint press conference with Taoiseach
Leo Varadkar in March 2018, the President of the European Council,
Donald Tusk, said that “risk of destablising the fragile peace process

http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/Documents/RaISe/Publications/2010/General/150
10.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLM6-67W3].
115. Special EU Programmes Body, PEACE IV Programme Overview,
https://www.seupb.eu/piv-overview [https://perma.cc/HD2A-QNRR].
116. DIÁNA HAASE & MAREK KOŁODZIEJSKI, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, NORTHERN
IRELAND
PEACE
PROGRAMME
1
(2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_3.1.9.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7BY-XRV8]. See
also Linda Racioppi & Katherine O’Sullivan, Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party
Intervention: The European Union’s Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation
in Northern Ireland, 32 PEACE & CHANGE 361, 370 (2007); PEACE IV Programme Overview,
SPECIAL EU PROGRAMMES BODY, https://www.seupb.eu/piv-overview [https://perma.cc/J2PP2D36] (last visited Dec 6, 2019).
117. See BREXITLAWNI, supra note 91.
118. Scottish EU Funding Portal, Cross-Border Programme for Northern Ireland, Border
Region of Ireland & South Western Scotland (2014-2020), https://portal.fundingportal.eu/funding-programmes/the-cross-border-territorial-cooperation-programme-fornorthern-ireland-the-border-region-of-ireland-and-western-scotland [https://perma.cc/PUS3BF2J].
119. N./S. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY ASS’N, PAPER 1: IMPACT OF BREXIT ON CROSSBORDER
ACTIVITY
40
(2016),
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/20162021/2016/northsouth/8816.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNP9-LXR3].
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must be avoided at all costs.” 120 The chief Brexit negotiator for the
European Union, Michel Barnier, has been equally resolute on the need
to safeguard the peace process and in particular the key tenets of the
Good Friday Agreement. In May 2017, he offered reassurance that
“nothing should put peace at risk” in the upcoming negotiations with
the UK. 121 Indeed, the European Commission Brexit Negotiation Task
Force included in its guiding principles a commitment to protect “the
gains of the peace process and of the Good Friday Agreement.” 122
The European Commission has also pledged to continue funding
“cross-border programmes supporting peace and reconciliation” 123 in
spite of Brexit, proposing to contribute EUR€120 million between
2021-2027—if mechanisms for appropriate matching monies can be
agreed with the UK and Irish governments. 124 Whilst there has been a
general commitment on the part of the United Kingdom to “match”
funding levels previously delivered across the United Kingdom by EU
programs, little detail has been provided with regard to Northern
Ireland-specific peace funding. In an article published in the mainly
nationalist newspaper The Irish News, then British Prime Minister
Theresa May stated that “there may be specific and valuable EU
programmes (including peace funding in Northern Ireland) for which
120. European Council, Remarks by President Donald Tusk After His Meeting with
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2018/03/08/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-after-his-meeting-with-an-taoiseachleo-varadkar/ [https://perma.cc/BG56-PM7B]; Órla Ryan, ‘Ireland First’: Donald Tusk Says
Every EU Leader ‘Wants to Protect Peace Process and Avoid Hard Border,’ JOURNAL (Mar. 8,
2018),
https://www.thejournal.ie/donald-tusk-brexit-ireland-3892678-Mar2018
[https://perma.cc/M7CZ-XXBA].
121. Lisa O’Carroll, Brexit Will Not Jeopardise Peace in Ireland, EU’s Chief Negotiator
Says, GUARDIAN (May 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/11/michelbarnier-brexit-will-not-jeopardise-peace-in-ireland-eu-chief-negotiator-says
[https://perma.cc/SY82-QHA3]. Michael O’Regan & Marie O’Halloran, Barnier says Brexit
Will Come At a Cost but ‘We Are Where We Are’, IRISH TIMES (May 11, 2017),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/barnier-says-brexit-will-come-at-a-costbut-we-are-where-we-are-1.3079612 [https://perma.cc/C75K-85WE].
122. European Comm’n, Task Force for the Preparation & Conduct of the Negotiations
with the U.K. Under Article 50 TEU, Guiding Principles Transmitted to EU27 for the Dialogue
on Ireland/Northern Ireland, TF50 (2017) 15, at 2-3 (Sept. 6, 2017).
123. John Campbell, Cross-border European funding to continue post-Brexit, BBC NEWS
(May
2,
2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-43977811
[https://perma.cc/3T9Z-RD6A].
124. John Campbell, EU Proposes to Continue NI Peace Funds, BBC NEWS (May 29),
2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44295917 [https://perma.cc/6642Y2XE]. Northern Ireland Office, Bradley Confirms £300 million to Secure Peace Funding for
Northern Ireland (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bradley-confirms-300million-to-secure-peace-funding-for-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/UJ5J-7MPT].
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we want to agree continuation of funding,” but the current British
government has to date refrained from making a firm commitment to
cover the direct costs of all such projects. 125 It thus seems likely that
these programs would have to compete for UK budget funds with key
areas such as health and education. 126
In sum, the involvement of the European Union (formerly EEC)
has been a given in the evolving peace process in Northern Ireland.
Indeed, that axiom—the “European dimension”—became an important
component in the language and context of all of the major peace
process-related papers from the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) until the
Good Friday Agreement (1998). Underpinning this commitment to the
political process, the EU has invested heavily in peace funding for
Northern Ireland and the border regions of the Republic of Ireland.
Whether or not the British government will uphold this very significant
financial contribution in the aftermath of Brexit remains uncertain. The
real challenge will be when hard choices need to be made, particularly
on the part of the UK government, between policies that will have a
direct and deleterious effect on the peace process and the type of Brexit
arrangements they seek to implement. Such hard choices will have the
most obvious impact within Northern Ireland itself and it is that subject
to which we now turn.
V. BREXIT, POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND IDENTITY
POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
The UK referendum result in favor of Brexit has had quite
profound implications for political relationships in Northern Ireland
given that fifty-six percent of the electorate there voted to remain in the
European Union. 127 The voting pattern within Northern Ireland reveals
125. Unattributed, Platform: Theresa May on Brexit, the Border, and Irish Citizenship,
IRISH NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/08/16/news/platformtheresa-may-1111504/ [https://perma.cc/LVC5-KVLG].
126. Ian Graham, UK Says to Consider Replacing EU Peace Funds for Northern Ireland,
REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2017, 3:11 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-irelandmay/uk-says-to-consider-replacing-eu-peace-funds-for-northern-ireland-idUKKCN1AW0HC
[https://perma.cc/BNQ2-RLA6]; Theresa May, Platform: British Prime Minister Theresa May,
IRISH
NEWS
(Aug.
16,
2017,
1:00
AM),
https://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/08/16/news/platform-theresa-may-1111504/
[https://perma.cc/KGT4-H97A].
127. See Results and Turnout at the EU Referendum, Electoral Commission,
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-andreferendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/results-and-turnout-eureferendum [https://perma.cc/Q6HX-3F9Q].
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a clear ethnonational divide. 128 Catholics overwhelmingly voted to
remain by a proportion of 85% to 15% whilst Protestants voted to leave
by a proportion of 60% to 40%; 129 correspondingly, “two-thirds of selfdescribed ‘unionists’ voted to leave, while almost 90% of selfdescribed ‘nationalists’ voted to remain”. 130 In such a context, as
Gormley-Heenan and Aughey have argued, the referendum result “was
bound to be taken as a victory for one community at the expense of the
other.” 131 There were other issues involved in the decision by Sinn Féin
to collapse the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly in January
2017 but, then Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, made clear
in his resignation letter that Brexit was a contributing factor.132
Moreover, the uncertainty regarding Brexit undoubtedly delayed the
re-establishment of the power-sharing executive – which did not
happen until January 2020. At this juncture, it may be useful to offer a
brief synopsis of the attitudes of the main political parties in Northern
Ireland towards Brexit and their views as to whether or not it represents
a threat to the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process.
The Democratic Unionist Party (“DUP”), the largest unionist
party, remained true to their Eurosceptic tradition and supported
Brexit. 133 As noted above, having secured ten seats at Westminster in
the 2017 general election, they entered into a “supply and demand”
arrangement with Theresa May and became centrally important to a
series of attempts to steer a Brexit deal through parliament. 134 The party
128. See JOHN GARRY, THE EU REFERENDUM VOTE IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF CITIZENS’ POLITICAL VIEWS AND BEHAVIOUR 2
(2016),
https://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitfilestore/Filetoupload,728121,en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VVD-WJ7Y].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, supra note 9, at 502.
132. Martin McGuinness, Martin McGuinness’ Resignation Letter in Full, BELFAST
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/martinmcguinness-resignation-letter-in-full-35353349.html [https://perma.cc/JPL3-XMZG]. For an
overview of the other factors which precipitated the collapse of the power-sharing institutions,
see generally SAM MCBRIDE, BURNED: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE CASH FOR ASH SCANDAL
AND NORTHERN IRELAND’S SECRETIVE NEW ELITE (2019); Deirdre Heenan & Derek Birrell,
Between Devolution and Direct Rule: Implications of a Political Vacuum in Northern Ireland?
89 POL. Q. 306 (2018).
133. See Gladys Ganiel, ‘Battling in Brussels’: The DUP and the European Union, 24
IRISH POL. STUD. 575, 585-86 (2009); Murphy & Evershed, supra note 5, at 7.
134. Cabinet Office, Confidence and Supply Agreement Between the Conservative and
Unionist
Party
and
the
Democratic
Unionist
Party (Jan. 23,
2020),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conservative-and-dup-agreement-and-ukgovernment-financial-support-for-northern-ireland/agreement-between-the-conservative-and-
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has insisted that Brexit does not represent a threat to the peace process.
For example, DUP deputy leader Nigel Dodds has argued that “to use
the peace process as an excuse to either thwart Brexit or to shape it in
the way some people want is quite frankly outrageous and
disgraceful.” 135 Although the DUP appeared to successfully hold first
Theresa May and then her successor, Boris Johnson, to the pledge that
there would be no diminution of the position of Northern Ireland within
the United Kingdom, the deal struck between Johnson and the
European Union in September 2019 was classed as a “hammer blow”
and a “betrayal” by seasoned unionist commentators. 136 As discussed
elsewhere in this Article, paranoia about betrayal by the British has
been a key feature of unionist politics since the formation of the
state. 137 The following junctures have all been regarded with suspicion
and in some instances contempt, by Ulster unionists: the proroguing of
Stormont in 1972, the Sunningdale Agreement 1973, the Anglo-Irish
Agreement 1985, the Downing Street Declaration 1993 and (in the eyes
of some within the DUP at least), the Good Friday Agreement of
1998. 138
The smaller Ulster Unionist Party (“UUP”) opposed Brexit in the
referendum but subsequently shifted its position, stating that it accepted
unionist-party-and-the-democratic-unionist-party-on-support-for-the-government-inparliament [https://perma.cc/73AA-H2NK]; see also ITV Report, How Did the DUP Become a
Key Player in the Brexit process? ITV (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.itv.com/news/2019-1016/how-dup-became-key-player-in-brexit-process/ [https://perma.cc/UV5U-DBPJ]; see Jane
McCormack, Brexit Deal: Why Does the DUP’s Opinion Matter? BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2019)
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-50086035 [https://perma.cc/HCS6-6Q9J].
135. Harriet Line, Using Peace Process to “Thwart” Brexit Outrageous, says Nigel
Dodds,
IRISH
NEWS
(Feb.
28,
2018),
https://www.irishnews.com/news/brexit/2018/02/28/news/using-peace-process-to-thwartbrexit-outrageous-says-nigel-dodds-1266918 [https://perma.cc/N42J-QZKB].
136. See Alex Kane, Boris Johnson’s Betrayal Will Leave the DUP With One Option – To
Back
Remain,
GUARDIAN,
(Oct.
28,
2019)
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/28/boris-johnson-dup-remain-arlenefoster-union-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/YRA9-KPSY]. Emilio Casalicchio, DUP Deals
Brexit Hammer Blow to Boris Johnson Ahead of Crucial EU Summit POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.politico.eu/article/dup-deals-brexit-hammer-blow-to-boris-johnson-ahead-ofcrucial-eu-summit/ [https://perma.cc/YK85-FBPW].
137. See A.T.Q. STEWART, EDWARD CARSON 125 (1981). For example, Edward Carson,
one of the most revered figures in Unionism complained bitterly that he had been betrayed by
the Tory Party during the campaign against home rule in Ireland. The Tories agreed to the AngloIrish Treaty in 1921 which, in effect, granted a version of home rule to 26 of the 32 counties.
Carson said “[w]hat a fool I was! I was only a puppet, and so was Ulster, and so was Ireland,
in the political game that was to get the Conservative Party into Power.” See Id.
138. JON TONGE ET AL, THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY; FROM PROTEST TO POWER
2, 5, 89 (2014).
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“the will of the British people” and that it would thus support Theresa
May in her efforts to “get the best deal for Britain and Northern
Ireland.” 139 Following this shift of position, the UUP produced a paper
that focused upon Northern Ireland post-Brexit. 140 There was no
explicit reference in this document to a perceived threat to the peace
process but one UUP Member of the NI Assembly (“MLA”)
interviewed by the authors expressed concerns about the prospect of
dissident republican violence in the context of a hard border. 141
Both major nationalist parties in Northern Ireland have remained
firm in their opposition to Brexit. Sinn Féin, formerly the political wing
of the IRA and now the voice of the majority of northern nationalists,
historically viewed increased European integration as a threat to Irish
sovereignty. 142 However, in recent years its increasingly pragmatic
approach to the European Union was evidenced in its opposition to
Brexit. Several Sinn Féin representatives interviewed by the authors
were concerned to highlight what they perceived to be the grave
implications for the peace process, adding that any hardening of the
border would inevitably invite physical force resistance from dissident
republicans (discussed further below). 143
The smaller of the nationalist parties, the SDLP, has always been
a strong supporter of the EU. 144 Not surprisingly, it has maintained a
clear anti-Brexit stance. SDLP leader Colum Eastwood has been clear
in his view that Brexit undermines the legacy of the Good Friday
Agreement, warning that it “carries with it the potential to dismantle
the architecture of our peace process.” 145 Another SDLP MLA
139. Sean O’Driscoll, UUP Ends Anti-Brexit Stance and Sides with DUP to Oppose Sinn
Fein, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (May 11, 2017), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/generalelection-2017/uup-ends-antibrexit-stance-and-sides-with-dup-to-oppose-sinn-fein35702386.html [https://perma.cc/D5CV-WTKC].
140. See generally ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, A VISION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
OUTSIDE THE EU (2016).
141. Interview with Member of the N. Ir. Legislative Assembly, Ulster Unionist Party, in
Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 9, 2018).
142. Agnès Maillot, Sinn Féin’s Approach to the EU: Still More “Critical” Than
“Engaged”? 24 Irish Pol. Stud. 559, 561 (2009).
143. Interview with Ard Chomhairle (governing body) member, Sinn Féin (Sept. 18,
2018); interview with Member of the European Parliament, Sinn Féin, in Derry, N. Ir. (Feb. 16,
2018).
144. Peter McLoughlin, The SDLP and the Europeanization of the Northern Ireland
Problem 24 IRISH POL. STUD. 603, 603 (2009).
145. Lesley-Anne McKeown, Don’t Let Brexit Ruin Labour’s Legacy, TIMES (Feb. 19,
2018),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/don-t-let-brexit-ruin-labour-s-legacy-vv9h5wqsl
[https://perma.cc/Z7R8-JUWY]. Unattributed, Jeremy Corbyn Warned of Potential to
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expressed concerns that Brexit has not only emboldened republican
dissidents but that it has “made being a part of the UK very
uncomfortable for a lot of nationalists.” He added: “It has just put
identity and the constitutional question right back into politics in a way
that the Good Friday Agreement had tried to minimise for decades . . .
it has agitated it in a very serious way.” 146
Finally, the centrist Alliance party is opposed to Brexit and has
expressed clear concern regarding the impact of Brexit on the peace
process. It calls for a special arrangement for Northern Ireland in order
to protect the Good Friday Agreement. Alliance’s concerns about the
impact of Brexit on political and intercommunal relations mirror very
closely those expressed by the SDLP interviewee in terms of a
perceived hardening of positions amongst both nationalists and
unionists and the undermining of what Alliance term a “shared
Northern Ireland.” 147 This brief overview of the stance taken on Brexit
by the five main political parties in Northern Ireland highlights a
number of key impacts that are worthy of closer examination. In the
following section, we explore two closely related contemporaneous
developments—the re-energizing of identity politics and the reemergence of Irish unity as a live political debate.
It would be naive to suggest that the Good Friday Agreement
somehow dissolved identity politics in Northern Ireland. The electoral
rise of Sinn Féin and the DUP—and their usurping of the ostensibly
more moderate counterparts of the SDLP and UUP—suggest that the
post-Good Friday Agreement electorate wants to be represented by the
strongest political voices from within their two communities.148
Indeed, the decision by then Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland,
Martin McGuinness, to collapse the Stormont executive was motivated
at least in part by what he saw as the DUP’s inability to come to terms
with expressions of Irish identity and culture including the Irish

Destablise Peace Process With Hard Brexit, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2018),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/jeremy-corbyn-warned-of-potentialto-destabilise-peace-process-with-hard-brexit-36617702.html [https://perma.cc/2PZV-CWVE].
146. Interview by BrexitLawNI with Member of the N. Ir. Legislative Assembly, Soc. &
Democratic Labour Party, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Feb. 20, 2018).
147. Interview by BrexitLawNI with Member of the N. Ir. Legislative Assembly, All.
Party of N. Ir., in Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 21, 2018).
148. See Jan Erik Mustad, From Protest to Power: The Rise of the DUP, in THE LEGACY
OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT: NORTHERN IRISH POLITICS, CULTURE AND ART AFTER
1998 73, 78-79 (Charles I. Armstrong, David Herbert & Jan Erik Mustad eds., 2019).
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language. 149 That said, the peace agreement undoubtedly succeeded in
reducing the communal focus on the constitutional question. The
various strands of the Agreement were developed precisely to
accommodate individuals who wished to identify as either British or
Irish – or both / neither or indeed European – and to embed the
complexities of both North-South and East-West relations. 150 It can
thus be argued that the Good Friday Agreement was less about
reconciliation than “agreement to differ amid a sharing or division of
power between the rival ethnic blocs.” 151 It was this element of
“constructive ambiguity” that allowed both sides to claim that they
were successfully “working” the deal and “transforming Northern
Ireland.” 152 As Bell and Cavanaugh argue, “each side knows that it is a
‘fudge’ but can live with it, and ‘sell’ it to their own constituents as
victory, or at least not a defeat.” 153
Todd suggests that the combination of the Good Friday
Agreement, devolution, the opening up of the border, the development
of key institutions such as the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB)
and the North South Ministerial Council, and the myriad benefits of
mutual British and Irish EU membership combined to diminish the
extent to which British sovereignty shaped the cultural identification
and constitutional allegiance of nationalists. 154 These factors managed
to secure the assent of pragmatists within northern nationalism—
people who were willing to live in Northern Ireland as part of the
United Kingdom “ . . . so long as their rights are respected and they
have a secure sense of identity, but with no emotional or sentimental
attachment to either Britishness or to the political institutions of the
149. Brendan O’Leary, The Twilight of the United Kingdom & Tiocfaidh ár lá: Twenty
Years After the Good Friday Agreement, 17 ETHNOPOLITICS 223, 230 (2018).
150. See generally JORG NEUHEISER & STEFAN WOLFF (EDS.), PEACE AT LAST?: THE
IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND (2003); JONATHAN
POWELL, GREAT HATRED, LITTLE ROOM: MAKING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2008).
151. Jonathan Tonge, Peter Shirlow, & James McAuley, So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?
How Interplay, Not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 26 IRISH POL.
STUD. 1, 4 (2011). See also JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O’LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN
IRELAND: BROKEN IMAGES 320-26 (1995); Paul Gillespie, The Complexity of British–Irish
Interdependence, 29 IRISH POL. STUD. 37, 47 (2014).
152. Tonge et al Id. at 14.
153. Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, Constructive Ambiguity or Internal SelfDetermination - Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement, 22
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1345, 1356 (1998).
154. See generally JENNIFER TODD, THE VULNERABILITY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND
SETTLEMENT: BRITISH IRISH RELATIONS, POLITICAL CRISIS AND BREXIT (2015).

2020]

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

643

United Kingdom.” 155 Although many unionists struggled with the
reality of seeing Sinn Féin in government, fears gradually eased as the
IRA proceeded to decommission its weapons and (for the most part)
exited the stage. The return (albeit intermittently) of power to Stormont
was also welcomed by unionists and the fact that initial fears that the
North South Ministerial Council (a key feature of the Good Friday
Agreement) would become a “Trojan horse” to reunification proved
unfounded combined to broadly reassure most that the union with Great
Britain and British identity for unionists, whilst requiring constant
vigilance, was secure. 156 One UUP MLA summed up well the impact
of Brexit on many northern nationalists’ identity:
Their perception post the Brexit referendum of this was that
English nationalists had come in over their heads and denied that
part of their identity which was critical to them feeling comfortable
about living here. 157

In addition, for some interviewees, the loss of a sense of
“Europeanness” was acutely felt. This issue was to the fore in our
public meetings with young people, with respondents emphasizing that
they welcomed their European identity as a means of avoiding having
to identify themselves as either British or Irish. 158
VI. BREXIT AND THE “MAINSTREAMING” OF IRISH
REUNIFICATION
The other closely related impact of Brexit has been the energizing
of debates on the prospect of a united Ireland. Since the Brexit
referendum, this issue has moved center-stage, attracting a level of
scrutiny on both parts of the island not seen since the time of partition.
Although reunification was the formal position of all of the nationalist
parties in Ireland prior to the Brexit referendum, in reality it was not a
major priority for any of them with the exception of Sinn Féin. 159 As
noted above, since Brexit, there has been a discernible sea-change in
155. Cathy Gormley-Heenan & Arthur Aughey, Northern Ireland and Brexit: Three
Effects on “the Border in the Mind,” 19 BRITISH J. POL. 497, 503 (2017).
156. JON TONGE ET AL., THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY: FROM PROTEST TO POWER
(2014).
157. BREXITLAWNI, BREXITLAWNI POLICY REPORT: BREXIT AND THE PEACE PROCESS
22 (2018) (quoting BrexitLawNI, Interview with UUP MLA, Belfast, Jan. 9, 2018).
158. Id. at 23 (quoting Brexit Café, Belfast, Dec. 8, 2017).
159. See generally Gareth Ivory, Revisions in Nationalist Discourse Among Irish Political
Parties, 14 IRISH POL. STUD. 84 (1999).
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attitudes towards a united Ireland. 160 At the MacGill Summer School
in July 2016 then Taoiseach Enda Kenny stated that, in relation to the
upcoming Brexit negotiations, the EU needs to prepare for a United
Ireland. 161 The Fine Gael led government in the Republic successfully
argued for the inclusion of provisions in the EU negotiations guidelines
to permit Northern Ireland to re-join the European Union as part of a
united Ireland 162 In August 2017, a cross-party parliamentary
committee in the Dáil endorsed a 450pp report detailing how a united
Ireland by consent could be achieved in light of Brexit. 163
Although unionists have not surprisingly rejected calls for a
border poll on Irish unity, it is notable that even some members of the
DUP have reluctantly accepted that the issue is unlikely to go away. In
2018 former NI First Minister and DUP leader, Peter Robinson,
suggested that, in light of the Brexit referendum and its aftermath,
“generational border polls” would be ‘‘the least divisive and
disruptive” means to address the question of a united Ireland.164
Certainly, for those within the business community, the prospect of
disruption to trade and economic wellbeing has caused many to reexamine their political compass. A UUP MLA told us: “Well, for the
first time I’ve had friends who would be unionists but are business

160. See generally DONNACHA Ó BEACHÁIN, FROM PARTITION TO BREXIT: THE IRISH
GOVERNMENT AND NORTHERN IRELAND (2019).
161. Pat Leahy, Kenny Says Border Poll Should be Considered in Brexit Talks, IRISH
TIMES (July 18, 2016), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/kenny-says-border-pollshould-be-considered-in-brexit-talks-1.2726382
[https://perma.cc/9JKC-6AVQ];
Gabriel
Samuels, Brexit Negotiators Should be Prepared for a United Ireland Referendum, says Irish
Prime
Minister,
INDEPENDENT
(July
20,
2016),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-referendum-ireland-unity-irishprime-minister-enda-kenny-what-it-means-a7145731.html [https://perma.cc/W2J6-Z2ZV].
162. Denis Staunton & Pat Leahy, Brexit summit: EU Accepts United Ireland Declaration,
IRISH TIMES, (Apr. 29. 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/brexit-summiteu-accepts-united-ireland-declaration-1.3066569 [https://perma.cc/CK6U-BYTG]. Jennifer
Rankin, Europe Could Allow a United Ireland to Join EU After Brexit, GUARDIAN (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/27/eu-to-debate-recognising-unitedireland-to-allow-swift-return-for-north [https://perma.cc/4LLD-D3LJ].
163. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT,
BREXIT AND THE FUTURE OF IRELAND UNITING IRELAND & ITS PEOPLE IN PEACE &
PROSPERITY (32/JCIGFA/02, Aug. 2017) (Ir.); see Irish Brexit Report Sets Out United Ireland
Proposal, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland40799475 [https://perma.cc/5N9B-VLAR].
164. Peter Robinson Queen’s University Speech: Full Text, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (June
9, 2018) https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/peter-robinsons-queensuniversity-speech-full-text-36992405.html [https://perma.cc/64P8-ME3A].
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people who trade with Dublin, with the Republic, just asking the
question, ‘what would be wrong with a united Ireland?’” 165
Two recent polls conducted in Northern Ireland suggest that
Catholic support for a united Ireland would increase in the event that
the United Kingdom leaves the EU Customs Union and Single market
and, in particular, in the context of a “hard border” being imposed on
the island. 166 Spurred on by this apparent change in public opinion, key
figures in northern nationalism have come together in a group titled
“Ireland’s Future” to campaign and lobby for serious debate on
constitutional change on the island of Ireland. 167 Whatever the
reliability of competing polls, as the intervention of Peter Robinson
illustrates, discussion on a united Ireland is now a firmly established
element of political discourse across the island. The prominence given
to these debates has not surprisingly had an unsettling effect within
(largely pro-Brexit) working-class loyalist communities.
Some unionist and conservative politicians have warned that the
Irish government “saying silly things about the border and the
constitutional issues” could provoke a violent reaction from Loyalist
paramilitaries. 168 Whilst loyalist leaders have to date exercised a degree
of cautious restraint with regard to such threats, as is discussed further
below, some individuals within their ranks have clearly been alarmed
both by debates on Irish unity and the apparent “betrayal” inherent in
the 2019 iteration of the Withdrawal Agreement.
165. BREXITLAWNI, supra note 146, at 24 (quoting BrexitLawNI interview with UUP
MLA, Belfast, Jan. 9, 2018).
166. See John Garry et al, What do People in Northern Ireland Think About Brexit? In
BREXIT AND THE ISLAND OF IRELAND 5, 7, available at http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Brexit-and-Island-of-Ireland.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAZ3-97VN]. See
also Gerry Moriarty, Brexit Would Boost Support for a United Ireland, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 3,
2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/brexit-would-boost-support-forunited-ireland-poll-finds-1.3616129 [https://perma.cc/5FKX-3DTP].
167. Freya McClements, Open Letter Began With “Recurring Theme” Around Denial of
Rights in North: Brexit “Changed Everything” and Dialogue on Reunification of Ireland now
“Centre Stage”, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019) https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irishnews/open-letter-began-with-recurring-theme-around-denial-of-rights-in-north-1.4071181
[https://perma.cc/ FC7C-XQNE].
168. Henry McDonald, David Trimble: Ireland Risks Provoking Paramilitaries Over Post
Brexit
Border,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
6,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/06/david-trimble-ireland-risks-provokingparamilitaries-over-post-brexit-border [https://perma.cc/95AC-P966]. Fiach Kelly, Simon
Carswell, & Steven McCaffrey, Government Rejects Trimble’s Warnings Over its Brexit Stance,
IRISH TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/government-rejectstrimble-s-warnings-over-its-brexit-stance-1.3453289 [https://perma.cc/2HAP-5WNR].
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In sum, despite the strong advocacy of the largest unionist party
in Northern Ireland (the DUP) for Brexit, one clear consequence of the
Brexit referendum result has been the increased prominence of the
issue of Irish reunification. This reflects significant levels of anger on
the part of northern nationalists, shifts in attitudes amongst politicians
in the Republic, and acceptance at least on the part of some elements
within the unionist community that the issue requires “contingency
planning.” 169 Given the seriousness of the consequences should
discontent provoked by Brexit spill over into civil disobedience and
violence, we now examine more closely the scale of that threat.
VII. BREXIT, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE
OF SECURITY
In this Part, we focus primarily on the risks presented by dissident
republicans as this has been the primary preoccupation of government
and security experts. In light of the loyalist reaction to the most recent
agreement between the British government and the European Union,
we also consider the likely impact on that community before turning to
examine the challenge of responding to such threats on both sides of
the Irish border. These are of course complicated by Brexit given the
centrality of the European Union to the governance and regulation of
security. Before exploring these contemporary security concerns, it is
necessary to provide some background on the relevant groups, their
history and capacity for violence, levels of community support and the
symbolic importance of borders within and between Ireland and
Britain.
The twentieth-century variants of Irish republicanism typically
trace their origins to a series of unsuccessful armed uprisings from 1798
onwards. The best known of these was the Easter Rising of 1916.
Although it failed militarily, the execution of the leaders and mass
imprisonment that followed, galvanized anti-British sentiment in
Ireland and laid the foundations for the Irish War of Independence
(1919-21). 170 Since the 1920s different republican groupings—
169. Peter Robinson, Some Refuse to Talk About the Elephant in the Room . . . but it is
Positioning Itself to Squat on their Laps, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/peter-robinson-some-refuse-to-talkabout-the-elephant-in-the-room-but-it-is-positioning-itself-to-squat-upon-their-laps37179957.html [https://perma.cc/6DVP-DDAK].
170. See generally DIARMUID FERRITER, A NATION NOT A RABBLE: THE IRISH
REVOLUTION 1913-23 (2015).
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particularly variants of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—have
engaged in what they term “armed struggle against British occupation
in Ireland.” 171 Following the War of Independence and the ensuing
negotiations and Anglo-Irish Treaty, the island of Ireland was
partitioned into the Irish Free State (granted self-government over 26
counties albeit within the ambit of the British Empire) and Northern
Ireland (comprising the six north-eastern counties). The partition of
Ireland subsequently became the primary focus for republican armed
struggle. Their efforts include the bombing campaign in England
(1939-40), the “Border Campaign” (1958-62), and the more
widespread guerrilla warfare campaign of 1969-1994. 172
In common with all political movements, the fusing, splitting, and
realignment of allegiances has been an enduring feature of Irish
republicanism. 173 Given that long history of often violent schisms, the
republican leadership expended considerable energy from the 1990s
onwards on managing their constituency in an effort to minimize the
risks of splinter organizations emerging to undermine the peace
process. 174 Whilst that strategy was largely successful, a small cohort
remained fundamentally opposed to the cessation of the campaign of
political violence. That cohort has in turn sub-divided but the term
“dissident republican” is employed collectively to refer to those
republican groupings who disagree with the peace strategy being
advanced by Sinn Féin and the mainstream republican movement. It
includes those who support the continuation of an armed campaign and
those who reject violence but express political opposition to the Sinn
Féin’s republican strategy. 175
171. See generally BRIAN HANLEY, THE IRA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (2010);
RICHARD ENGLISH, THE HISTORY OF THE IRA (2003).
172. TOMMY MCKEARNEY, THE PROVISIONAL IRA: FROM INSURRECTION TO
PARLIAMENT 110-14 (2011).
173. See generally J. BOWER EELL, THE SECRET ARMY: THE IRA (1997).
174. The Provisional Irish Republican Army, later known generally as the IRA, was the
largest and most lethal republican paramilitary organization operating in Northern Ireland from
1969 onwards. Sinn Féin, led from 1983 until 2018 by Gerry Adams, was the political wing of
the IRA. The IRA called a cease-fire in 1994, briefly returned to violence in 1996 and then
reinstated its cease-fire in 1997. In 2005 the IRA’s ruling Army Council issued a statement
announcing, “a formal end to the armed campaign.” That year the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning announced that the “totality of the IRA’s arsenal” has been
decommissioned. See Eamonn O’Kane, After 35 years of Bombs and Blood a Quiet Voice Ends
the IRA’s War, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2005); Eamonn O’Kane, Decommissioning and the Peace
Process: Where Did It Come From and Why Did It Stay So Long? 22 IRISH POL. STUD. 81
(2007); ED MOLONEY, A SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA (2003).
175. DISSIDENT IRISH REPUBLICANISM (P.M. Currie & Max Taylor eds., 2011).
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In general, dissident republicans regard the Sinn Féin peace
strategy as a “sell-out” and a betrayal of the sacrifices of past
generations of republicans. 176 The three most prominent “dissident”
groups are the Real IRA (“RIRA”), the Continuity IRA (“CIRA”) and
Óglaigh na hÉireann (“ONH”). The smaller republican vigilante group,
Republican Action Against Drugs (“RAAD”) voted in 2012 to merge
with the Real IRA (“RIRA”) to form what is often referred to by
journalists as the New IRA. 177 In 2017 a new dissident group calling
itself Arm na Poblachta (“Army of the Republic”) claimed
responsibility for a roadside explosive device in Belfast. In the twenty
years since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, more than fifty
people have been killed by these various dissident republican
organizations. 178 Twenty-nine people died and over 200 were injured
in one incident when the Real IRA detonated a bomb in the center of
Omagh, Co. Tyrone, in 1998. This provoked widespread condemnation
and led the British and Irish governments to introduce additional antiterrorism legislation designed to counter the organization. 179 The
organization’s capacity was significantly reduced in the aftermath of
Omagh but sporadic fatal attacks against police, army and prison
personnel persisted. Between 2009 and 2019, dissidents were
responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers,
two prison officers and a journalist. 180 MI5 continue to classify the
threat from dissident republicans as “severe” meaning that an attack is
highly likely. 181
It is important to stress that the capacity of these groups to engage
in violence is significantly less than their Provisional IRA
176. See generally JOHN F. MORRISON, THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF DISSIDENT IRISH
REPUBLICANISM: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL SPLITS (2014); MARISA
MCGLINCHEY UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE POLITICS OF “DISSIDENT” IRISH REPUBLICANISM
(2019).
177. See generally ANDREW SANDERS, INSIDE THE IRA: DISSIDENT REPUBLICANS AND
THE WAR FOR LEGITIMACY (2011).
178. Jon Tonge, A Campaign Without End?: “Dissident” Republican Violence in
Northern Ireland, 5 POL. INSIGHT 1, 14 (2014).
179. Michael White, MPs Recalled to Match Dublin Anti-Terror Law, GUARDIAN (Aug.
25,
1998),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1998/aug/25/houseofcommons.uk
[https://perma.cc/67BQ-TZJL].
180. Northern Ireland: Dissident Republican Terrorist Groups, SECURITY SERVICE MI5,
(2018), https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/A86S-R5NL].
181. Karen Bradley, ‘Security Situation in Northern Ireland: Written Statement’, HOUSE
OF COMMONS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/writtenquestions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2018-12-17/HCWS1187/
[perma.cc/EWE9-QVQC].
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predecessors. All dissident groups are heavily monitored by the police
and security services—a task made easier by their much smaller size
and relatively low level of community support. 182 It would nonetheless
be foolish to dismiss the potential for increased republican dissident
violence as a result of Brexit. It is also important to remember that,
historically, widespread popular support has not been a pre-requisite
for armed republican action in Ireland. For example, the IRA had been
reduced to a very small cadre of committed activists in the aftermath of
the Second World War but this did not preclude a resurgence of the
organization in the 1950s. 183 Interestingly, some of the republicans
interviewed by the authors highlighted the IRA “Border Campaign” of
“by way of caution against dismissing the potential threat of dissident
republicanism post-Brexit”. 184
Most dissident republican groups supported Brexit in the belief
that the European Union represents the interests of capital rather than
working-class people and that it infringes on Irish sovereignty. 185 In
particular, as the authors have previously argued:
Brexit is broadly viewed [by dissident republicans] as ideological
confirmation of Britain’s imperialist attitude and a classic example

182. After the mainstream republican movement adopted the conjoined strategy of “the
armalite and the ballot box” in the early 1980s, Sinn Féin’s political support in Northern Ireland
plateaued in the nationalist republican community at approximately thirty-three percent while
the conflict was ongoing, with the SDLP picking up the bulk of the remaining sixty-six percent.
By way of comparison, at the moment political parties linked to dissident republicanism would
only be able to point to a handful of independent councilors elected, with a share of the overall
vote in the last council elections (2014) of just 1.5% of the total votes cast. By contrast, in the
same election, Sinn Féin polled 24% of the total of first preference votes and the other nationalist
party the SDLP polled 13.5%. See CAIN WEB SERVICE, Local Government Elections (NI)
Thursday 22 May 2014, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/2014lg/rd2014.htm
[https://perma.cc/QLH9-SGBR]; BRIAN FEENEY, SINN FEIN: A HUNDRED TURBULENT YEARS
(2003); Bernadette Hayes & Ian McAllister, Public Support for Political Violence and
Paramilitarism in NI and the Republic of Ireland 17 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 599 (2005).
183. See ANNA BRYSON, THE INSIDER: THE PRISON DIARIES OF EAMONN BOYCE 19561962 10-11 (2008); BARRY FLYNN, SOLDIERS OF FOLLY: THE IRA BORDER CAMPAIGN 195662 11-33 (2009).
184. BREXITLAWNI, supra note 147, at 31 (discussing interview with veteran republican,
May 24, 2018); See generally the excellent play concerning the symbolic link between the border
and intergenerational armed struggle MICHAEL J. MURPHY, MEN ON THE WALL (1961).
185. Paddy Hoey, Dissident and Dissenting Republicanism: From the Good
Friday/Belfast Agreement to Brexit 43 CAPITAL & CLASS 73 (2019); Henry McDonald, Dissident
Republicans in Northern Ireland Seize Moment to Fight Partition, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/hardline-republicans-sense-northernireland-chance-break-away-derry-eu-referendum [https://perma.cc/87LW-AHSA].
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of the usurpation of Ireland’s right to sovereignty and selfdetermination. 186

In view of the fact that Brexit is proceeding against the wishes of
the majority of people in Ireland, North and South, one life-long
republican suggested that it is: “[t]he embodiment of Britain’s colonial
mindset towards Ireland, ignoring what the Irish people want, or what
is in the interests of the Irish people and simply pursuing their own
selfish and strategic interest which is based on narrow British
jingoism”. 187 “Invoking an age-old republican dictum,” a leading
dissident republican told the authors that “from a republican
perspective, we always look at England’s disadvantage as our
advantage.” 188 Although he was personally skeptical about the benefits
of EU membership he explained that: “You are getting to the point
where you don’t care what happens as long as Britain breaks up, or the
union breaks up [ . . . ] we will take national sovereignty whatever way
it comes to us.” He thus delighted in what he viewed as the “marred
swamp of British constitutional politics” since the Brexit vote and
adding that, “everybody is just sitting waiting for the so-called ‘United
Kingdom’ to implode.” 189
The most welcome aspect of Brexit from a dissident republican
perspective is the spotlight that it has placed on the existence of the
border. A spokesperson for the dissident group, Saoradh, suggested that
Brexit had exposed “ . . . what basically has been since 1998 a soft
occupation in the North.” 190 This, in his view, was “manna from
heaven.” 191 When questioned about the views of republican dissidents
on the respective merits of a “hard” versus “soft” Brexit, he suggested,
“the harder the better.” 192 In particular, he noted that any kind of
military presence or infrastructure on the Irish border would be “highly
antagonistic” to Irish republicans. 193
186. See BREXITLAWNI, supra note 91, at 31.
187. BREXITLAWNI, supra note 147, at 32 (quoting interview with veteran republican,
May 24, 2018).
188. Id.
189. BREXITLAWNI, supra note 147, at 32 (quoting interview with dissident republican
spokesperson, Dungannon, May 24, 2018).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See reports of the Saoradh Ard Fheis (annual party conference); Leona O’Neill,
Dissident Group Saoradh in Pledge to “Exploit” Brexit, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dissident-group-saoradh-in-pledgeto-exploit-brexit-36334512.html [https://perma.cc/W6TB-GLMW].
193. Id.
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Amongst the interviews carried out by the authors with
republicans (including dissident republicans) in border areas in
Northern Ireland, there was widespread consensus that Brexit and the
prospect of a hard border, in particular, would indeed be a potential
mobilizing agent for not only protest and violence but also illegal
smuggling activities. Other studies suggest that there would be
increased support for violence in the nationalist community well
beyond the border regions in the event of a hard border. 194 This latter
risk—of Brexit radicalizing previously mainstream nationalists—was
raised by a veteran Provisional IRA leader and now senior Sinn Fein
member who is widely respected for his work in implementing the
peace process. He told the authors:
I am less worried by the dissidents than I am about mainstream
republicans, particularly a new generation of younger republicans
and how they will react if there is some form of a hard border. This
may become a serious challenge for us [mainstream republican
leaders] trying to stop people reacting to this. 195

Fears of a potential security risk in the event of a hard border are
clearly shared by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”). In
May 2018 then Chief Constable, Sir George Hamilton, announced that
a business case was being drawn up to fund the recruitment of up to
four hundred additional officers to serve along the Irish border. 196 Mr.
Hamilton explained that he needed to ensure that his organization was
194. Garry et al. found that more that almost three quarters of Catholics and eighty-two
percent of Sinn Féin supporters would find it “almost impossible to accept” customs installations
being protected by British soldiers. JOHN GARRY, ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UK’S
EXIT FROM THE EU: WHAT DO PEOPLE THINK? (2018). See John Garry & Brendan O’Leary,
While May Must Decide What to do About Northern Ireland and Brexit, Here’s What the People
Themselves
Think,
HUFF.
POST,
(May
21,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/northernireland_uk_5b028f02e4b07309e05a36c1?guc
counter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly91a2FuZGV1LmFjLnVrL3doaWxlLW1heS1tdXN0
LWRlY2lkZS13aGF0LXRvLWRvLWFib3V0LW5vcnRoZXJuLWlyZWxhbmQtYW5kLWJy
ZXhpdC1oZXJlcy13aGF0LXRoZS1wZW9wbGUtdGhlbXNlbHZlcy10aGluay8&guce_referre
r_sig=AQAAAKbZ4lRZtwWpyPeNl4gP7RZ_fQZMbDTIfDZWDvcDj3g3eH0WnTEb58KU
SvclAI20eqZkNyIVKj6I2JsARkI5A9foCudEXmmHZCeX_3iFHwp_KfklIntLjPvTXyquo2N
OKWyAcy6lFaj8tX-tBRTd5Ejf6ag00k4n0EHhDGAYxl [https://perma.cc/8RBH-DFLQ].
195. BREXITLAWNI, supra note 147.
196. Vincent Kearney, Police ask for More Resources Ahead of Brexit, BBC NEWS (May
31,
2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44320401
[https://perma.cc/D2YC-FZDJ]. Gerry Moriarty, ‘Hundreds’ of extra PSNI Officers Needed for
Border After Brexit, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-andlaw/hundreds-of-extra-psni-officers-needed-for-border-after-brexit-1.3713680
[https://perma.cc/GTF3-PLUB].
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“match fit” for the post-Brexit era. 197 More recently, his successor
Simon Byrne told the Guardian newspaper that, “We are very clear
here. We do not support the establishment of checkpoints or monitoring
cameras right near the border and we’d be very reluctant to be drawn
there because of the threat to our officers.” 198
While much of the focus since Brexit has been on the risk posed
by dissident republicans, political developments since the details of the
proposed Johnson deal with the EU in 2019 have concentrated attention
on the possibility of violence or civil disobedience emanating from
loyalist sources. By way of background, loyalist paramilitaries carried
out a violent campaign in support of the maintenance of the union with
Britain and the perceived failure of the government to deal effectively
with Republican “terrorism.” 199 The main loyalist paramilitary
groupings are the Ulster Defence Association (“UDA”) (also
sometimes referred to as the Ulster Freedom Fighters), the Ulster
Volunteer Force (“UVF”), the Red Hand Commando (“RHC”) and the
now-defunct splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (“LVF”). 200
Their targets were traditionally uninvolved Catholic civilians,
economic or civilian targets in the Irish Republic and republican
activists. 201 Regarding themselves as primarily defensive in nature,
they consider that they were driven to the use of political violence by
the IRA, defending not only the link with the United Kingdom but also
their own community from republican violence. 202
Whilst the major loyalist organizations announced a ceasefire in
1994, they (in common with their republican counterparts) have
continued to be involved in political violence. 203 Much of that violence
197. Id.
198. Vikram Dodd, Hard Border Would put Officers Lives at Risk says Northern Ireland
Police Chief, GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2019/sep/18/hard-brexit-would-put-officers-lives-at-risk-says-northern-ireland-policechief [https://perma.cc/ 4JGE-DM2C].
199. STEVE BRUCE, THE RED HAND: PROTESTANT PARAMILITARIES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 62, 189 (2002); AARON EDWARDS, UVF: BEHIND THE MASK 47-48 (2017).
200. JIM CUSACK & HENRY MCDONALD, UVF 303 (1997); HENRY MCDONALD & JIM
CUSACK, UDA: INSIDE THE HEART OF LOYALIST TERROR 20-25 (2005).
201. See Christina Steenkamp, Loyalist Paramilitary Violence After the Belfast
Agreement, 7 ETHNOPOLITICS 159, 160-61 (2008).
202. IAN WOOD, CRIMES OF LOYALTY: A HISTORY OF THE UDA 2-3 (2006).
203. CAROLYN GALLAHER, AFTER THE PEACE: LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES IN POSTACCORD NORTHERN IRELAND 8-12 (2007); JAMES MCCAULEY & GRAHAM SPENCER EDS.,
ULSTER LOYALISM AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT 176-99 (2011); JAMES MCCAULEY,
VERY BRITISH REBELS: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF ULSTER LOYALISM 123-39 (2015).
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has been directed inwards at other loyalists. 204 There have been
conspicuous acts of political leadership by individual loyalists but the
three main loyalist organizations have also been heavily involved in
criminal activity including drug dealing, extortion and robberies.205
While Sinn Féin has emerged as the largest nationalist political party,
the political wings of the two largest loyalist paramilitary organizations
(the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party) failed
to make significant electoral inroads after the Good Friday
Agreement. 206 As pro-state paramilitary groups, Loyalist have had an
ambivalent relationship with that state, often expressed as a strong
sense that their “loyalty to queen and country” is insufficiently
recognized. 207 In addition, there is a deep-seated fear within both
loyalist and unionist politics and culture that they are always vulnerable
to betrayal by the British. 208 This has, as noted, been inflamed by Boris
Johnson’s recent apparent U-turn on the question of a trade border
along the Irish sea. 209 Unsurprisingly, unionist politicians and some
204. In total forty-one loyalist paramilitaries have been killed since the 1998 Good Friday
Agreement. All of those deaths were at the hands of other loyalist paramilitaries. See Paul Noal,
The Cruel Peace: Killings in Northern Ireland Since the Good Friday Agreement, DETAIL
NETWORK, (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.thedetail.tv/articles/the-cruel-peace-killings-innorthern-ireland-since-the-good-friday-agreement
[https://perma.cc/VVK2-Z9JY].
Unattributed, “158 Security-Related Deaths” Since Good Friday Agreement, BBC NEWS (Apr.
23,
2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-43862294
[https://perma.cc/LM7M-NNR8].
205. Vincent Kearney, Loyalist Paramilitary Groups to Support Rule of Law, BBC NEWS,
(Apr.
9,
2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-43698164
[https://perma.cc/2YR8-FE2J]. In 2019, the Police Service of Northern Ireland reported that the
UDA and UVF remain heavily involved in criminality. Vincent Kearney, Loyalist
Paramilitaries: Once You Join it’s Impossible to Get Out, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-47072147 [https://perma.cc/XC2ZA4VT].
206. In 2019 the Progressive Unionist Party has no seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly
and three local council seats. By comparison, Sinn Féin has twenty-seven Assembly seats and
105 council seats. The Ulster Democratic Party dissolved in 2001. See Northern Ireland
Assembly,
Statistics,
http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/mlas/statistics.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EWX7-X5RG]; Unattributed, Ulster Democratic Party Dissolved, GUARDIAN
(Nov.
28,
2001),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/nov/28/northernireland
[https://perma.cc/AED8-F7YA].
207. PETER TAYLOR, LOYALISTS (1999); Brian Graham, The Past in the Present: The
Shaping of Identity in Loyalist Ulster 16 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 3, 483 (2004).
208. See generally Cheryl Lawther, The Truth About Loyalty: Emotions, Ex-combatants
and Transitioning from the Past, 11 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 484 (2017); PAMELA
CLAYTON, ENEMIES AND PASSING FRIENDS: SETTLER IDEOLOGY IN 20TH CENTURY ULSTER
(1996).
209. At the 2018 DUP Annual Conference then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson stated,
“[n]o British government could or should sign up to border in the Irish sea between mainland
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loyalist paramilitaries have decried this act as part of the “slippery
slope” towards a united Ireland. 210 Hundreds of loyalists (including
prominent paramilitaries) have attended public meetings on the “great
betrayal,” and one prominent activist has claimed there will be “mass
resistance” if the deal is enacted. 211 While there is some evidence of
other senior loyalists exercising a restraining influence, the PSNI Chief
Constable has indicated that (in a mirror image of nationalist anger
towards any hard border) “you can anticipate a lot of emotion in loyalist
communities and the potential for civil disorder.” 212
Regardless of the source, Brexit has presented a number of legal
and practical problems for the governance of security in Northern
Ireland and between Northern Ireland and the Republic. In particular,
many aspects of cross-border cooperation between police and security
agencies in the two jurisdictions have been done through the EU

UK and Northern Ireland.” As noted above, his 2019 agreement nonetheless includes provision
for a de facto border down the Irish Sea. See Andrew Quinn, Watch Boris Johnson Tell the DUP
in 2018 He Would Never Put Border in the Irish Sea - Today He Put a Border in the Irish Sea,
NEWSLETTER (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/politics/watch-borisjohnson-tell-the-dup-in-2018-he-would-never-put-border-in-the-irish-sea-today-he-put-aborder-in-the-irish-sea-1-9110754 [https://perma.cc/RP9S-EQNB].
210. Siobhan Fenton, Boris Johnson’s Deal has Left Northern Irish Loyalists Uneasy, but
Will
it
Lead
to
Violence?,
NEW
STATESMAN
(Oct.
25,
2019),
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/northern-ireland/2019/10/boris-johnsons-deal-hasleft-northern-irish-loyalists-uneasy-will [https://perma.cc/YW3W-TRG8]; Ceylan Yeginsu, In
Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal is Seen as ‘Betrayal’, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/world/europe/northern-ireland-brexit.html
[https://perma.cc/ KK5U-7GRX].
211. Suzanne Breen, Brexit: Loyalist Bryson Warns of “Mass Resistance” from Unionist
Community,
BELFAST
TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
23,
2019),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/brexit/brexit-loyalist-bryson-warns-of-massresistance-from-unionist-community-38622504.html [https://perma.cc/TS7M-ABBP]; Allison
Morris, Loyalists Meet in Unprecedented Show of Unity over Brexit Betrayal, IRISH NEWS (Oct.
22,
2019),
https://www.irishnews.com/news/brexit/2019/10/22/news/loyalists-meet-inunprecedented-show-of-unity-over-brexit-betrayal—1744947/
[https://perma.cc/TTG8CDXX].
212. Brexit: PSNI Chief says Potential for Loyalist Disorder if Brexit Threatens Union,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-50157743
[https://perma.cc/SRA7-9MNB]. Bimpe Archer, ‘Loyalist Community can Mobilise Large
Numbers for Public Disorder’ – PSNI Chief Constable Simon Byrne, IRISH NEWS (Oct. 25,
2019),
http://www.irishnews.com/paywall/tsb/irishnews/irishnews/irishnews//news/northernirelandne
ws/2019/10/25/news/if-loyalists-believe-brexit-deal-threatens-union-loyalist-community-canmobilise-large-numbers-for-public-disorder—-psni—1748072/content.html
[https://perma.cc/36Z5-A95K].
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regulatory framework. 213 A key challenge identified by police and
security professionals was the insistence from the UK government that
ending the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”)—the EU’s supreme judicial authority—was a “red line”
issue. 214 Given that all security related disputes on the interpretation of
the EU framework are ultimately resolved by the CJEU, this presents a
serious problem for security and policing officials. While this position
appeared to soften slightly with the 2019 EU Withdrawal Agreement,
there has been no fundamental change in relation to justice and security
issues. Under Article 89 of that Agreement, the jurisdiction of the
CJEU persists throughout the transition period, but it (largely) ends
thereafter. For eight years following the transition period, UK courts
will only be able to send cases to the CJEU if they concern EU citizens
living in the United Kingdom, 215 or if they relate to some of the
protocols on Northern Ireland and Cyprus. 216 The CJEU will not have
jurisdiction for justice and security matters.
By way of illustration of the practical and legal challenges
involved, the European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) facilitates the
extradition of individuals between EU member states, including
between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. This legal
framework, which has operated since 2004, has no provisions for thirdcountry membership, meaning that the United Kingdom is very
unlikely to be able to remain within it after it leaves the European
Union. 217 The loss of the EAW is a particularly important issue in the
context of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Ireland,
and more specifically, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland. Historically, extraditions were a source of significant tension
between the Republic and the United Kingdom resulting in multiple
213. For more on this, see Amanda Kramer, Rachael Dickson & Anni Pues, Evolving
Justice Arrangements Post-Brexit, IRISH HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUALITY COMMISSION AND
NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (Aug. 2019).
214. David Green, Brexit: Why did the ECJ Become a UK “Red Line”? FINANCIAL TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/32cd1e87-c7d1-3026-86fc-bce5229711d1
[https://perma.cc/GWG5-84ML]. Dan Roberts, Not Much Remains of Theresa May’s Red Lines
After
the
Brexit
Deal,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
8,
2017)
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/08/not-much-remain-theresa-may-red-linesbrexit-deal [https://perma.cc/3VL4-29LU].
215. Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland From the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, art. 89, Oct.
19, 2019 (Gr. Br.) [hereinafter October Withdrawal Agreement].
216. Id. art. 182.
217. Kramer et al. supra note 213.
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time-consuming and expensive legal challenges. 218 The introduction of
the EAW shifted the focus away from bilateral arrangements between
the British and Irish states to an EU one, reducing the political
sensitivities and making the process much more efficient and less
costly. Whereas previously extradition cases were sometimes held up
for years in the Irish courts, the average extradition time under the
EAW has been reduced to 48 days. 219 The Chief Constable of the PSNI
has warned that the EAW is “critical” in its efforts to counter crime and
terrorism, 220 a fact also acknowledged by the former UK Prime
Minister Theresa May, 221 the Irish Minister for Justice, Charlie
Flanagan, 222 and the head of the police in the Republic. 223
Similarly, data sharing between policing, security, and
prosecution officials via EU databases is premised on EU
218. See generally MICHAEL FARRELL, SHELTERING THE FUGITIVE: THE EXTRADITION
POLITICAL OFFENDERS (1985); Colm Campbell, Extradition to Northern Ireland:
Prospects and Problems, 52 MODERN L. REV. 585 (1989); Kieran McEvoy, Law, Struggle, and
Political Transformation in Northern Ireland, 27 J. OF L. AND SOCIETY 542 (2000).
219. Kramer et al supra note 218, at 4.
220. Mark Bain, Brexit: Northern Ireland Security at Risk if UK Kicked Out of EU
Extradition System, Warns Police Chief, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (June 20, 2018)
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/brexit-northern-ireland-security-atrisk-if-uk-kicked-out-of-eu-extradition-system-warns-police-chief-37029094.html
[https://perma.cc/PVK5-S8UW]. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, BREXIT: THE
PROPOSED UK-EU SECURITY TREATY, 2017-2019, HL 164 (UK) at 165.
221. Philip Oltermann, Theresa May Wants New Security Treaty With EU Next Year,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 17 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/17/theresa-maywants-new-security-treaty-with-eu-next-year [https://perma.cc/X43F-5N2Z]. Tim Shipman,
Brexit: Theresa May Pledges to Keep EU Arrest Warrant and Europol Links, TIMES (Feb.11,
2018), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/theresa-may-pledges-to-keep-eu-arrest-warrant-andeuropol-links-lj2pkx6lg [https://perma.cc/KRG4-Y3K2].
222. Barry Roche, Flanagan Urges UK to Maintain Extradition Arrangements PostBrexit, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irishnews/flanagan-urges-uk-to-maintain-extradition-arrangements-post-brexit-1.3797165 [DNV8E9N4]. Ralph Riegel, Flanagan Warns that Brexit Must Not Impact on Anglo-Irish and EU
Judicial
security
co-operation,
INDEPENDENT
(Feb.
18,
2019),
https://www.independent.ie/business/brexit/flanagan-warns-that-brexit-must-not-impact-onanglo-irish-and-eu-judicial-security-co-operation-37825468.html
[https://perma.cc/43U42TZA].
223. Unattributed, Police Chiefs Pledge Continued Border Co-operation Whatever Brexit
Brings,
BELFAST
TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/police-chiefs-pledge-continuedborder-cooperation-whatever-brexit-brings-37503123.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2RH-87S9].
Niall O’Connor, Garda Commissioner Drew Harris Tells Summit that Brexit Will Not Harm
Cross-Border
Policing
Efforts,
IRISH
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/garda-commissioner-drew-harris-tells-13550656
[https://perma.cc/RJJ7-6NKH].
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membership. 224 It is clear that the United Kingdom has placed high
value on these databases as it is part of the Schengen Information
System (“SIS II”), the European Criminal Record Information System
(“ECRIS”), the Passenger Name Records (“PNR”), Europol
Information System (“EIS”), and Prüm. 225 The reason why the risks of
the UK having limited access to such databases are real are because of
the lack of third-party membership precedents, the removal of CJEU
jurisdiction, concerns about the adequacy of data protection and the
loss of Article 8 protections under the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union. 226 It raises a number of problems for practical
policing and prosecutorial cooperation, particularly given the
increasingly cross-border nature of criminal activity. 227
As demonstrated above, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave
the European Union creates a significant challenge for the governance
of security. The potential for border infrastructure or border checks
between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom or
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has been met with threats
from dissident republicans and more recently some loyalist groups.
Both Brexit “solutions” put forward have the potential to incite
paramilitary violence and raise serious challenges to the governance of
security in the United Kingdom. What is clear is that both the May and
Johnson Conservative governments have prioritized “sovereignty”
concerns (illustrated here by ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU) over
the warnings from police figures and legal experts about the
consequences of losing access to many essential tools for policing,
justice, and security cooperation.
VIII. CONCLUSION: BREXIT AND THE LIMITATIONS OF LAW
In this final section, we wish to examine the role of law in general
and rights discourses in particular in the context of Brexit. The
centrality of human rights protections to the Good Friday Agreement
224. STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW (3rd ed. 2011); EUROPEAN
UNION COMMITTEE, BREXIT: FUTURE UK-EU SECURITY AND POLICE COOPERATION, 2016-17,
HL 77 (UK), Valsamis Mitsilegas, European Criminal Law After Brexit 28 CRIM. L. F. 219
(2017).
225. Kramer et al., supra note 213, at 61.
226. See generally Lokke Moerel & Ronan Tigner, United Kingdom: Data Protection
Implications of Brexit 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION P. REV. 381 (2016); UK Home Affairs
Committee, UK-EU SECURITY COOPERATION AFTER BREXIT (2018).
227. Interview with Senior Legal Practitioner, Nov. 9, 2018.
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and the broader peace process in Northern Ireland has been much
discussed elsewhere. 228 As McCrudden has argued, the source of these
rights are diverse—”with devolved, national, international and
supranational elements layered on top of each other”—and their object
was to protect the dual national makeup of the local population as well
as the broader human rights and equality provisions which “transcend
the issue of differing national allegiances.” 229 The Good Friday
Agreement explicitly commits to “the protection and vindication of the
human rights of all” (para 2) and notes the obligations of the “sovereign
government” in relation to “the principles of full respect for and
equality of civil, political, social and cultural rights” (para 1v). This
latter part of the Agreement also includes reference to the right of the
people of Northern Ireland “to identify themselves and be accepted as
Irish or British or both, as they may so choose” (para 1vi).
In addition, as noted above, Irish and UK membership of the
European Union is clearly assumed as axiomatic both in the key
antecedent agreements and the Good Friday Agreement itself. This
international treaty affirms in its preamble the desire of the British and
Irish governments to: “develop still further the unique relationship
between their peoples and the close co-operation between their
countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European
Union.”
Article 17 of the Agreement also commits the North South
Ministerial Council to considering “the European Union dimension of
relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and
programmes under consideration in the EU framework.” 230 We argue
that these rights are fundamentally affected by Brexit and that, despite
the apparent promises of the Good Friday Agreement and its enabling
legislation, law has failed to protect these rights and by extension the
broader peace process. We will also argue that the manifest limitations
of legalism provide a useful corrective to the risks of overselling human
rights in the broader political and legal conversations concerning both

228. See generally Paul Mageean & Martin O’Brien, From the Margins to the
Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday Agreement 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1499
(1998); HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND
(Colin Harvey ed., 2001); JENNIFER CURTIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AS WAR BY OTHER MEANS:
PEACE POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2014).
229. Chris McCrudden, The Belfast-Good Friday Agreement, Brexit & Rights, ROYAL
IRISH ACADEMY/BRITISH ACADEMY 3 (2017).
230. The Belfast Agreement, U.K.-Ireland, Code of Conduct, sec. 17, Apr. 10, 1998.
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the governance of Northern Ireland and indeed with regard to the
potential of a united Ireland.
One direct legal consequence of Brexit will be that people in
Northern Ireland will not have the ability to use the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (“ECFR”) as a means of asserting the rights
developed in the European Union since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.
Although the ECFR is an instrument of comparative infancy, it
contains important additional provisions to the European Convention
on Human Rights concerning economic and social rights—effectively,
the single-market rights—of living, traveling, working and claiming
benefits around the European Union, plus the democratic rights of
engaging with the European Parliament. 231 These rights are ultimately
enforceable through the CJEU. Although the UK (along with Poland)
secured what they believed to be an opt-out to Charter (Protocol 30 of
the Lisbon Treaty), in practice it affirms many of the fundamental
rights already recognized in EU laws to which the UK government has
signed up. 232 A central challenge will be whether Irish passport holders
in Northern Ireland will be able to access the same services in the
Republic and throughout the European Union as their fellow Irish
citizens who live south of the border—a concern which has featured
prominently for nationalists. 233
More generally, Brexit has been the subject of a number of
important legal challenges to the power of the Executive in the UK
231. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights After the Treaty of
Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 645, 681 (2011).
232. For a useful overview see, Human Rights Consortium, Rights at Risk, Brexit, Human
Rights and Northern Ireland (2018).
233. Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, UK’s Decision to Leave the EU:
Recommendations on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill (2017). In Sept. 2018 the prominent nationalist
commentator Brian Feeney observed, “As Britain ignores the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
and leaves the European Court of Justice, this Conservative government begins to unravel the
network of rights-based provisions in the GFA. It was never envisaged that the final arbiter of
human rights and equality here would be the UK Supreme Court. Nationalists looked to the
international clout of the EU as a final court of appeal. Northern nationalists turned their backs
on Westminster in last year’s election when the British kicked away these two pillars of the
peace process; neutrality, and EU guarantees of rights and equality.” Brian Feeney, Polls Show
Final Alienation of Northern Nationalists from the British Government, IRISH NEWS (SEPT. 5,
2018),
http://www.irishnews.com/paywall/tsb/irishnews/irishnews/irishnews//opinion/columnists/201
8/09/05/news/brian-feeney-polls-show-final-alienation-of-northern-nationalists-from-thebritish-government-1423812/content.html [https://perma.cc/J89L-VJZ4]. See also Newton
Emerson, ‘Brexit and Rights a Route for Republicans to Closer Unity with the EU, IRISH TIMES
(July 12, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/brexit-and-rights-a-route-for-republicansto-closer-unity-with-eu-1.3561538 [https://perma.cc/P24C-3M7C].
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courts. In R v Miller, 234 the government lost (8-3) in the UK Supreme
Court on the key question as to whether or not it could trigger
withdrawal from the European Union as prescribed by Article 50 of the
TEU without an Act of Parliament using the Executive’s ‘Foreign
Affairs Powers.’ Having lost, the government was forced to bring the
first EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 before the House of
Commons two days later. Further, in August 2019, in an apparent effort
to avoid detailed parliamentary scrutiny of his Brexit plans, the new
Conservative Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, prorogued parliament for
five weeks, reconvening just seventeen days before the United
Kingdom’s scheduled departure from the European Union. In the
ensuing legal challenge which eventually reached the Supreme Court,
the government again lost (11-0). 235 The government losses on both of
these major cases before the Supreme Court were understandably
celebrated in Britain by those opposed to Brexit as evidence of the
courts upholding parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. 236
However, from the vantage point of the Irish peace process, the
Good Friday Agreement and the devolution settlement, the limitations
of the law have been laid bare. This is apparent in a number of Northern
Ireland related legal challenges to Brexit brought by politicians and
civil society activists. These cases focus on the central question as to
whether or not authorization from Parliament is required before the
British government can trigger Article 50 and thus exit the European
Union.
In Agnew and McCord (heard together in the High Court in
Belfast), a key argument put forward was that the prerogative power is
not available in relation to the triggering of Article 50 because it is
displaced by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Good Friday
Agreement and British-Irish Agreements that underpin it. In their view
the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 are “inextricably
234. Miller & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union (Rev 3) [2017] UKSC 5.
235. R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent)
Cherry and others (Respondents) v Advocate General for Scotland (Appellant) (Scotland) [2019]
UKSC 41.
236. Gina Miller, the lead applicant in both cases said on the steps of the Supreme Court
after her second victory, “Today is not a win for any individual or cause, it’s a win for
Parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and the independence of our British courts.
Crucially, this ruling confirms that we are a nation governed by the rule of law.” Gina Miller,
Who is Campaigner Behind Brexit Court Cases?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37861888 [https://perma.cc/79AZ-MU6F].
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woven” with continuing membership of the European Union. 237
McCord’s lawyers argued further that, since a majority in Northern
Ireland had voted to remain in the European Union, the withdrawal
process effectively amounted to a change in the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland - again contrary to the Good Friday Agreement and
section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 238 In respect of all of these
issues, Justice Maguire dismissed the applications, stating the consent
principle related only to the question of whether or not Northern Ireland
should remain part of the United Kingdom and not to other
constitutional changes such as leaving the European Union. 239
Part of the first Miller judgment before the Supreme Court also
examined whether any legislation authorizing the triggering of Article
50 would require the granting of a Legislative Consent Motion by the
devolved Assemblies. 240 The judges were unanimous in finding that
there is no legal requirement to secure the consent of the devolved
institutions (in Scotland and Northern Ireland). They concluded that
neither Section 1 nor Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act is of
assistance in this case, and that the Sewel Convention - that
Westminster should not legislate for devolved matters without the
consent of the devolved legislature - was precisely that, a convention
rather than a legally enforceable obligation. 241 In the second Miller
case, the Supreme Court also heard arguments (from Ronan Lavery QC
again on behalf of Mr. McCord) that a no deal Brexit would lead to
chaos, economic misery and would fundamentally undermine the peace
237. Reported as Re McCord’s Application [2016] NIQB 85. Steven Agnew was the leader
of the Green Party in Northern Ireland which is vehemently opposed to Brexit. He and a number
of other anti-Brexit party leaders and civil society activists acted together in this challenge to the
legality of Brexit. Their judicial review was conjoined with another challenge from Mr Raymond
McCord, a prominent victims’ rights campaigner whose son was killed by loyalist paramilitaries.
Id.
238. The Northern Ireland Act (1998) enacted the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern
Ireland Act Chpt. 47 of 1998. Section 1 (i) states “It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in
its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent
of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this
section in accordance with Schedule 1.” Id. sec. 1(i). Schedule 1 (3) states that “the Secretary of
State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if at any time it appears likely to him that a
majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of
the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.” Id. sec. 1(3). Such a border boll can only
happen after seven years since the last one.
239. Re McCord’s Application [2016] NIOB 85, at 44-45.
240. Miller & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union (Rev 3) [2017] UKSC 5.
241. Re McCord’s Application [2017] UKSC 5.
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process. Given that the focus of the case was on the prorogation of
parliament, Mr. Lavery was told by the judges during the hearing
(correctly in our view) that his submissions were not sufficiently
relevant and the issue does not feature in the judgment. 242
In a separate legal challenge heard by the Northern Ireland Court
of Appeal (again involving Mr. McCord as one of the litigants and Mr.
Lavery QC as counsel) the court heard arguments that the some of the
UK government’s proposals in negotiating with the European Union
on withdrawal did not protect the Good Friday Agreement and/or were
not compatible with the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 243 In particular, this
case focused on the Section 10(1) of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, on
the “Continuation of North-South co-operation and the prevention of
new border arrangements,” which requires that, “[i]n exercising any of
the powers under this Act, a Minister of the Crown or devolved
authority must (a) act in a way that is compatible with the terms of the
Northern Ireland Act 1998.” 244 The Lord Chief Justice of Northern
Ireland, Sir Declan Morgan, who heard the appeal with two other senior
judges, acknowledged the applicants’ submission that:
a UK withdrawal from the EU without an agreement would give
rise to the very considerable risk of a deterioration in the security
situation in Northern Ireland, an adverse impact on the Northern
Ireland economy and a severe limitation on the work of the
implementation bodies operating with the support of the NorthSouth Ministerial Council. 245

Nonetheless, he and his fellow judges concluded that the
Executive is exercising prerogative powers in its negotiations with the
European Union and that “Section 10 of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018

242. Supreme Court: Ex-PM’s Lawyer Argues Against Prorogation, BBC NEWS (Sept.
19, 2019). Mr Lavery was told by Supreme Court President Lady Hale that the court was “solely
concerned” with the lawfulness of the Prime Minister’s decision to prorogue parliament, not
arguments about the nature of Brexit. Id.
243. Re McCord, JR83 and Waring (Brexit JRs) [2019] NICA 49.
244. The latter section emerged as a result of amendment by Lord Chris Patten in the
House of Lords (the UK’s upper house) as the Withdrawal Bill 2018 progressed. He said the
purpose of the amendment was to “ensure that Brexit does not mean the emergence, at any level,
of any new conflict about the border because that would be both economically catastrophic and
politically lethal, that’s why this amendment is so vital.” Id. at 12. Lord Patten is a former
Conservative Minister in Northern Ireland, he chaired the independent commission on policing
which shaped the policing transition in the jurisdiction, and he is a prominent campaigner against
Brexit.
245. Id. at 27.
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does not expressly or by necessary implication abrogate that exercise
of prerogative power.” 246
In sum, the courts have undoubtedly reasserted the authority of
the UK parliament over the Executive in the two Miller cases. As Elliot
has argued, while the first Miller judgment may be viewed as a
“progressive blow against the archaism of Crown prerogative” it also
represents a defense of a rather traditional approach—seeing the UK
constitution exclusively as a contest between the Executive and the
Westminster Parliament—a vision that is “myopically bilateral in
nature.” 247 In reviewing the earlier Northern Ireland cases, as well as
the devolution facing aspects of Miller 1, Anthony has similarly argued
that the very traditional notions of sovereignty adopted by the courts in
these cases—in effect that the sovereignty of Westminster trumps all
of the complexities of the competing claims and allegiances contained
in the Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland Act—illustrate
that Brexit has taken “ . . . power-hoarding to its logical – and perhaps
even undemocratic - conclusion.” 248 McCrudden and Halberstam have
been even more critical of the performance of the courts in these cases.
They refer to the “cursory” and “cavalier” nature of the first Miller
judgment on the issues relating to Northern Ireland—a judgement
which (they argue) ignored the political circumstances of devolution in
Northern Ireland, the international underpinnings of the NI
constitution, the effects of Brexit on the North-South bodies and which
failed to address the myriad rights issues raised in Northern Ireland

246. Id. at 36. A further Brexit-related case worthy of note is that of Emma DeSouza. In
2015 she applied as and Irish citizen born in Northern Ireland for a residence card for her
American husband. The UK Home Office ruled that she would have to either reapply identifying
herself as British or first renounce her British citizenship and reapply as an Irish citizen. On
appeal, the Upper Tribunal found that DeSouza is a “British citizen by automatic operation of
law under the British Nationality Act” and that “the British Nationality Act rules that anyone
born in Northern Ireland was automatically British until such time as they renounce that
citizenship”. Ms DeSouza argues that the issue is Brexit-related because it speaks to the
uncertainty of how people who identify as Irish and EU citizens in Northern Ireland will be
treated after the UK leaves the EU. Her appeal is pending. See Simon Carswell, What is the
Emma DeSouza Case About? Ruling Means NI people are British Citizens Under UK Law Even
if They Identify as Irish, IRISH TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019).
247. Mark Elliott, The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional
Principle 762 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 257, 282 (2017).
248. GORDON ANTHONY, Sovereignty, Consent and Constitutions: The Northern Ireland
References, in THE UK CONSTITUTION AFTER MILLER 201 (Mark Elliott, Alison L. Young &
Jack Williams eds., 2018)
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based Brexit litigation. 249 We agree. In short, law has largely failed to
protect the Good Friday Agreement, some key rights guaranteed
therein, and more broadly, the peace process in Ireland.
That said, perhaps one should not have expected anything
different. A central plank of the Vote Leave campaign and the
subsequent “let’s get Brexit done” approach has been to dismiss experts
and expertise as “naysayers” getting in the way of the great Brexit
vision. In light of numerous warnings from authoritative economic
sources about the consequences of Brexit, one of the Vote Leave
leaders, Conservative MP Michael Gove, famously declared, “people
in this country have had enough of experts.” 250 This has become a
mantra amongst Brexiteers. Regardless the empirical facts, Brexit
leaders have adopted a deliberately demotic style of speaking, claiming
to be at one with “ordinary people,” addressing their fears and
anxieties, breaking taboos and “telling it like it is on issues like
immigration” and of course “taking back control.” 251
Fuller has argued persuasively that the “anti-expert revolution”
evident in the Brexit process speaks to what he terms a “post-truth”
phenomenon, part which of resonates with the Rousseauian idea that
“there is a special wisdom to be found in crowds, especially when they
are agreed on a course of action, even if it remains radically unclear
how it might be brought about and what its outcomes might look
like.” 252 In such a context, any truth, fact, expert opinion, or indeed
legal finding which impedes Brexit is inevitably subject to hysterical
reactions concerning the will of the British public. 253 For example,
249. CHRIS MCCRUDDEN & DANIEL HALBERSTAM, ‘Miller and Northern Ireland: A
Critical Constitutional Response, in THE UK SUPREME COURT YEARBOOK 31, 37 (Daniel
Clarry, ed., 2018).
250. Henry Mance, Britain has had Enough of Experts, Says Gove, FINANCIAL TIMES
(June 3, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c
[https://perma.cc/77NB-CZ2N]. Gove made this statement during a SKY NEWS Question and
Answer session when refusing to name any economists who backed Britain’s exit from the EU.
251. See generally John Clarke & Janet Newman, People in This Country Have had
Enough Of “Experts”: Brexit and the Paradoxes of Populism, 11 CRITICAL POL’Y STUD. 101,
111 (2017).
252. STEVE FULLER, POST-TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AS A POWER GAME 21 (2018).
253. James Slack, Enemies of the People: Fury Over “Out of Touch” Judges Who Have
“Declared War on Democracy by Defying 17.4m Brexit Voters and Who Could Trigger
Constitutional Crisis, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-triggerconstitutional-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/KYC4-RKY5]. Similar stories appeared in THE SUN
and THE DAILY EXPRESS. Jon Lockett, “This is Exactly Why We Voted Out” Fury Over
“Unelected Judges” Who Derailed Brexit Plans with Bombshell Court Ruling, SUN (Nov. 3,
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when the High Court delivered the first Miller judgment, the British
Daily Mail front-page headline (complete with pictures of the three
judges) was, “Enemies of the People: Fury Over ‘Out of Touch’ Judges
who Have ‘Declared War on Democracy’ by Defying 17.4 million
Brexit Voters and who Could Trigger Constitutional Crisis.” 254 When
judges experienced such a reaction to a judgment which after all
reasserted traditional British parliamentary sovereignty, perhaps
expecting a judgement which said that the Good Friday Agreement
could trump Brexit and thwart the United Kingdom from leaving the
European Union was really quite an ask.
As we have noted above, one of the direct consequences of Brexit
has been the re-energizing of discussions on a united Ireland. Like
Brexit, a united Ireland would represent quite a seismic constitutional
and political change on these islands and its advocates have rightly
argued that it requires careful debate, discussion and planning. 255 There
are important lessons to be learned from the experience of Brexit
concerning the role and limitations of law in such a process—
particularly with regard to human rights and the notion of sovereignty,
two central components of the Brexit project.
With regard to human rights, as the eminent anthropologist
Clifford Geertz has suggested, part of the lure of law is that it represents
a way of seeing the world not necessarily as it is but rather as we would
2016),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2111725/fury-over-unelected-judges-who-derailedbrexit-plans-with-bombshell-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/GLV3-2P7M]. Macer Hall, Brexit:
EU Ruling on Article 50 is “An Affront to British People”, EXPRESS (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/728591/Brexit-EU-ruling-Article-50-affront-Britishpeople-High-Court [https://perma.cc/9SME-RQZV]. The more “highbrow” DAILY TELEGRAPH
headline was, The Judges Versus the People – again with the three judges pictured. Peter
Dominiczak, Christopher Hope, & Kate McCann, Judges vs the People: Government Ministers
Resigned to Losing Appeal Against High Court Ruling, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/03/the-plot-to-stop-brexit-the-judges-versus-thepeople/ [https://perma.cc/4WKT-GD46]. One month after the Miller judgment had been
delivered, the President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, criticized the media for
undermining the rule of law and politicians for not responding quickly enough in defense of the
independence of the judiciary. News Report, Attacks on Judges Undermine Law – Supreme
Court President, BBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38986228
[https://perma.cc/EBK3-6WPB].
254. James Slack, Enemies of the People: Fury Over “Out of Touch” Judges Who Have
“Declared War on Democracy” by Defying 17.4m Brexit Voters and Who Could Trigger
Constitutional Crisis, MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-triggerconstitutional-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/PB92-9GDB].
255. See generally COLIN HARVEY & MARK BASSETT, THE EU AND IRISH UNITY;
PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN IRELAND (2019).
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like it to be—“the sense, without which human beings can hardly live
at all, much less adjudicate anything, that truth, vice, falsehood, and
virtue are real, distinguishable, and appropriately aligned.” 256 One of
the authors has written previously about the limitations of legalism in
post-conflict societies like Northern Ireland. 257 Drawing from research
in a range of transitional societies, and influenced by “critical friends”
to the human rights movement such as Baxi, Ignatieff, and Kennedy, 258
McEvoy argued against a version of rights discourses wherein the real
world of confusion, messiness, and tough choices is translated through
rights discourses into the legalese of international standards and legal
certainty. 259 McEvoy did not suggest throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. Human rights can and should provide a practical and
normative framework for the hard graft of political persuasion and
argumentation. Of course, framing the legal and constitutional
architecture of what a united Ireland would look like, particularly in
terms of guaranteeing the political identity, culture and human rights
of Ulster unionists would be a central part of such a process.260
However, human rights guarantees are, as Harvey has also argued,
“only a beginning” rather than an end in itself. 261 They certainly cannot
magically resolve fundamentally political contests on profoundly
complex matters of political identity.
Similar lessons should be learned from the ways in which
sovereignty has been understood and deployed by Brexiteers. In his
widely critiqued book on eminent Victorians, 262 the leading Brexiteer
and unapologetic advocate of empire nostalgia, Jacob Rees-Mogg,
includes a chapter on Professor Albert Venn Dicey, Vinerian Professor

256. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE; FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 231 (1983).
257. See generally Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding
of Transitional Justice, 34 J. L. & SOCIETY 411 (2007).
258. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002), MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001); David Kennedy, The
International Human Rights Movement; Part of the Problem, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101
(2002).
259. Kieran McEvoy, supra note 257, at 418-419.
260. PAUL GOSLING, A NEW IRELAND: A NEW UNION, A NEW SOCIETY 93-96 (2018).
261. Colin Harvey, Bringing Humanity Home: A Transformational Human Rights Culture
for Northern Ireland?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN TRANSITION: THE NORTHERN IRELAND
CONTEXT 61 (Anne-Marie McAlinden and Clare Dwyer eds., 2015).
262. JACOB REES-MOGG supra note 29.
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of English Law at Oxford. 263 Dicey is best known for his exposition of
the legal theory of parliamentary sovereignty. He was also an
enthusiastic imperialist, 264 an ardent unionist, 265 and is described by
Rees-Mogg as the “father of the referendum” in British politics (Dicey
believed that a referendum could prevent Home Rule in Ireland). 266 In
short, Dicey embodies the fusion of imperial delusion, hard-line
unionism, a convenient belief in referenda when deployed in favor of
one’s own cause, and the narrow understanding of sovereignty that
underpins the Brexit project.
If Irish republicans and nationalists are to succeed in persuading
their unionist countrymen and women of the benefits of a united
Ireland, they will have to do so much better than the Brexiteers. Mistyeyed republicanism is as likely to resonate with Ulster unionists as did
the empire nostalgia of Rees-Mogg and his Brexiteer colleagues
amongst Irish nationalists. As discussed above, whilst the Good Friday
Agreement provides the mechanism by which a border poll on a united
Ireland can take place, unlike Brexit, such a poll should not be an end
in itself but rather one stage in a carefully thought-through plan. More
broadly, the related discussions on sovereignty will have to be more
intellectually ambitious than that which posits sovereignty as a
constitutional arrangement between the Executive, Parliament (or
Executives and Parliaments if the devolved government and Assembly
in the North were retained) and the people.
As Morison has argued, it is important to stop considering
sovereignty as only “a thing in itself” and rather to view it as a way of
thinking about power and governance more generally, recognizing that
the constitutional “big fix” is but one element of a broader mosaic of
innovative small fixes beyond the state. 267 Brexit and its fall-out have
provided the road map for how not to do it. Perhaps, we will all be
grateful for that in the final analysis.
263. See A.N. Wilson, The Victorians by Jacob Rees-Mogg Review, “A Staggeringly Silly
Piece of History”, TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-victorians-byjacob-rees-mogg-book-review-zqltrw5rz [https://perma.cc/ 6EPB-LT7F].
264. Dicey argued “ . . . the material advantages accruing to millions of British subjects
from the Imperial power of England may more and more tend to produce that growth of loyalty
and goodwill towards the Empire which in 1914 is a characteristic and splendid feature both of
England and of her colonies.” THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION: A.V. DICEY 466 (J.W.F.
Allison ed., 2013).
265. ALBERT VEN DICEY, ENGLAND’S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE 6 (1887).
266. JACOB REES-MOGG, supra note 29, at 361 (kindle edition).
267. John Morison, A Sort of Farewell: Sovereignty, Transition and Devolution in the
United Kingdom, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW 123 (Richard Rawlings ed., 2013).
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